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ARTICLE 
THE CAT THAT CATCHES MICE: CHINA'S 
CHALLENGE TO THE DOMINANT 
PRIVATIZATION MODEL 
Lan Gao* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most extraordinary dramas of our century has 
produced one of the most compelling paradoxes of our time. 
Communist rule in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union has ended, and the Berlin Wall has collapsed. Market-
oriented economic reforms and political democratization have 
been introduced to the region, conforming with popular notions 
of the paradigm for reform.1 Yet, the transformation from to-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; B.A. Mt. Holyoke Col-
lege; J.D. Yale Law School. I would like to thank Samuel Murumba, Arthur Pinto 
and Anthony Sebok for their comments on an earlier version of this Article. I 
would also like to thank James Grandolfo and Joshua Peirez for their research 
assistance. This Article was supported by a summer research stipend from Brook-
lyn Law School. 
1. The idealized paradigm consists of simultaneous political and economic lib-
eralization, or at least one followed in rapid succession by the other. In the case 
of transitional economies, the virtues of immediate and rapid privatization of 
planned economies have received widespread approval from Western institutions 
and economists. See, e.g., John R. Guardiano, Exploding the Myths About Economic 
Reform in Russia, Heritage Foundation Rep. (Heritage Foundation) No. 930, (Mar. 
9, 1993), available in LEXIS, EXEC Library, HFRPTS File ("The solution to 
Russia's economic problem is not less reform, but more reform. The government 
should press ahead quickly with a comprehensive and full-fledged economic reform 
program that would include continued mass privatization of state industry .... 
Economic reform, moreover, should be carried out in a wholesale and not piece-
meal manner."); Jeffrey Sachs, Accelerating Privatization in Eastern Europe: The 
Case of Poland, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON 
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIES 1991 (1991). 
Political transformation to democracy is also deemed indispensable to eco-
nomic transformation. See, e.g., U.S. Policy Toward the Former Soviet Union: Hear-
ings of the House Foreign Affairs Comm., 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1994) ("Our 
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talitarianism to political democracy has also wreaked economic 
chaos and disillusionment, and in the Soviet Union, disintegra-
tion from central authority into centrifugal conglomerates 
euphemistically called the "Commonwealth of Independent 
States." 
On the other side of the globe, the antithesis to Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union can be found in China. 
There, Tiananmen Square and political repression coexist with 
an economy currently experiencing one of the most rapid 
growth rates in the world. Nominally socialist but steadfastly 
market-oriented, China is embarking on a strategy of slow but 
steady economic transformation. 
"Privatization" is a term used to describe the means by 
which a centrally planned economy can effectively make the 
transition to a market economy.2 While there are critical dif-
approach in assembling last year's foreign assistance program was to reinforce 
those trends in Russian political and economic life that together, we believe, con-
stitute the essence of the great transformation underway in that country. Those 
trends are democratization and privatization.") (testimony of Strobe Talbott, Deputy 
Secretary of State) (hereinafter Talbott Testimony). 
Eastern Europe fits the Western paradigm for reform because it emphasizes 
both political democracy and immediate privatization of the state sector. 
2. For a more in-depth discussion of the evolving meanings associated with 
the term "privatization," see discussion infra part II.A. 
While the privatization debate, at least in the context of emerging market 
economies, usually centers around the transformation of an economy from central-
ized to more decentralized arrangements, its subtext is also about political liberal-
ization. For the view that political and economic liberalization go hand in hand, 
see Michael Hirsh, The State Strikes Back, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1993, at 
123, 127 ("[U]ltimately the development debate is also about how best to achieve 
democracy."); Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism, Prosperity and Democracy, 2 CONST. 
POL. ECON. 372, 372 (1991) ("A constitution designed to promote economic develop-
ment and democratic reform could provide an important stimulus in both direc-
tions."). 
For the view that economics and politics are more often sequentially or 
causally rather than simultaneously linked, see MARsHALL I. GoLDMAN, WHAT 
WENT WRONG WITH PERESTROIKA (1991). "The simultaneous introduction of the 
economic reforms associated with perestroika and the political reforms referred to 
as glasnost all but guaranteed that chaos would follow .... [A]s early as 1987, it 
was apparent that combining perestroika and glasnost was like mixing sulfuric 
acid and water-it would set off sparks." Id. at 124-25; Samuel Huntington, Chal· 
lenges Facing Democracy: What Cost Freedom, CURRENT 22, 25 (1993) ("[E)conomic 
development promotes democratization .... Transitions to democracy are heavily 
concentrated among countries at the upper-middle income level of development."). 
It has also been argued that one should be given priority over the other. "One of 
the bitterest lessons of the 'transition' is: You can have bread without freedom, 
but you cannot enjoy freedom forever without brea~." Shlomo Maital & Ben-Zion 
Milner, Russia and Poland: The Anatomy of Transition, CHALLENGE, Sept. 1993, at 
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ferences between privatization processes employed by China 
and Eastern Europe, both regions have produced a set of com-
mon transitional dilemmas. Hidden traps beneath the path of 
reform have become an increasingly volatile and disruptive 
force. The initial euphoria associated with change has given 
way to a host of sobering concerns: how to dismantle an obso-
lete system of bureaucratic central planning,3 construct a new 
economic order grounded on institutions of a fledgling market 
economy, and at the same time, create economic growth and 
increased productivity with some semblance of order, or at 
least with minimum disorder. 
There are generally two exits for countries previously 
organized under the principles of full public ownership of the 
means of production and compulsory state economic planning.4 
First, the dramatic "Big Bang'' exit, characterized by radical 
"shock therapy'' prescriptions adopted by many of the Eastern 
European countries, involves immediate privatization of the 
state sector, including the swift transfer of assets from public 
to private hands. Second, the more gradual, less explosive form 
42. 
3. For a compelling presentation of the view that it is not socialism per se 
that has been rejected but rather Soviet-style socialism, see John Elliott, Challeng-
es Facing Social Economics in the Twenty-First Century: A Radical Democratic 
Perspective, 51 REV. Soc. ECON. 504 (1993); Paul M. Sweezy, Socialism: Legacy 
and Renewal, MONTHLY REV., Jan. 1993, at 1-9. 
4. The race to depart from Marxist economic orthodoxy to embark on a mar-
ket-oriented path of reform has begun for almost all countries organized under the 
principles of central planning. See, e.g., Barbara Bradley, Burma Capitalism is 
Half-Baked but on the Rise, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 25, 1995, at 8 (The 
government has abandoned "'the Burmese Road to Socialism'" in favor of a free 
market by privatizing farming and other industries); Cuba, COUNTRY REP. (Walden 
Pub.), (Jan. 30, 1995), available in LEXIS, World Library, COUREP File (By the 
end of 1994, various concessions to a mixed market were made allowing farmers 
to sell above-quota surplus at market prices and local state industries to sell man-
ufactured products to the public at market rates); llja Halasz, Mongolia to Open 
Stock Trading to Foreigners, Reuter Asia-Pac. Bus. Rep., Feb. 5, 1995, available in 
LEXIS, News Library, NONUS File (Mongolian privatization of its state companies 
have resulted in about half of its 2.2 million people becoming shareholders of 
former state enterprises); Daniel Southerland, Mongolia Takes a Hard Road, 
WASH. POST, June 13, '1992, at Gl; Vietnam Halves Number of State-Owned Firms, 
Reuters World Service, Feb. 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, NONUS 
File (Communist Vietnam has reduced the number of its state-owned firms to 
approximately 6000, half the 1990 figure. The government has dissolved 2000 
money-losing state enterprises, restructured others into shareholding companies to 
improve their performance and currently has plans to open a pilot stock exchange 
to trade in government bonds). 
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of disengagement pursued by China, involves the initial cre-
ation of a nonstate sector followed by limited privatization of 
the state sector. This path has been called "socialism with 
Chinese characteristics,"5 and more specifically, "privatization 
with Chinese characteristics."6 This method of privatization is 
characterized by a strategy which eschews the current Eastern 
European wholesale transfer of state enterprises from the state 
to the private sector. 
Although there are two generally recognized ex-
its-gradual extrication from the central plan or a quick leap 
to private ownership-it has been assumed that all exits lead 
to the same common destination: a Western style economy 
based on full private property rights. This Article explores the 
more uncommon and seemingly less dramatic approach favored 
by China, an approach gradual in speed and different in orien-
tation from the Eastern European approach. The Chinese mod-
el is based on carefully orchestrated sequences7 designed to 
create a two-track economic system consisting of parallel state 
and nonstate sectors. Thus, the Chinese model makes an in-
herent distinction between privatizing the state sector and 
creating a nonstate sector. Additionally, within this separate 
5. Deng Xiaoping first coined this term in a statement about China's at-
tempts to deal with its exploding population growth. "[T]he problem of China is its 
excessive population . . . . [O]nly a socialist system can solve this problem . . .. 
The socialism we are talking about is one with Chinese characteristics." China 
Can Only Go the Socialist Road, PEOPLE'S DAILY (overseas ed.) June 24, 1989, at 
1. 
6. Matthew Bersani, Privatization and the Creation of Stock Companies in 
China, 3 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 301, 302 (1993). 
7. This description does not suggest that the central authorities in Beijing 
have always been successful in prescribing reform from above. As a popular Chi-
nese saying goes, "Those above propose a policy; those below implement their 
own." Gerrit Gong, China's Fourth Revolution, 17 WASH. Q. 26, 32 (1994). China's 
reformers themselves describe the process as one of trial and error, similar to 
"groping for stones to cross the river." Carl Riskin, Where is China Going?, in THE 
CHINESE ECONOMY AND ITS FuTURE 41, 52 (Peter Nolan & Dong Fureng eds., 
1990). 
Indeed, Beijing has often been surprised by renegade initiatives undertaken 
by commercially minded provinces without the capital's prior blessings. For exam-
ple, officials of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, located across the border 
from Hong Kong in one of China's most prosperous regions, Guangdong Province, 
unilaterally decided on December 18, 1990, to open its own stock exchange without 
asking for Beijing's approval. Beijing's response to this open act of defiance was 
not to shut down the exchange, but rather to allow it to exist if Shenzhen in turn 
agreed to a postponement of a few months. See Orville Schell & Todd Lappin, 
China Plays the Market, 1992 THE NATION 727. 
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nonstate sector, the Chinese model has also spawned unortho-
dox economic organizations founded on hybrid, nontraditional 
concepts of ownership. As this Article will argue, the success of 
these unorthodox entities not only challenges conventional pre-
scriptions for economic reform but also calls into question the 
traditional dichotomy between centrally planned and market 
economies. 
Beyond the inherent distinctions it draws between the 
state and nonstate sectors, the Chinese model is particularly 
interesting for two primary reasons. First, its very success 
poses a serious challenge to the conventional view that the 
only effective reform package is the one offered by the "shock 
therapy'' school.8 Although proponents of "shock therapy'' re-
form argue that only the faint-hearted will reject this route, 
because anything less will result in distorted economic develop-
ment, the "anti-shock" model has been adopted quite success-
fully by China. 
The Cltinese model is also interesting for a second and 
perhaps more significant reason. Its success challenges many 
of the implicit and fundamental assumptions that have re-
mained buried in the privatization debate. It has been as-
sumed, for example, that the objective of transitional econo-
mies is to privatize in order to arrive at the same inevitable 
destination, namely a full and unfettered market economy 
founded on clear, transparent and unambiguous private prop-
erty rights. With so unquestioned a goal, the only thing left to 
be worked out is the speed with which this goal can be accom-
plished. Thus, even though there may be hares and tortoises 
on this transitional path, it is supposed that both will aim 
towards and arrive at a common end point modeled on the 
advanced industrial economies. 
With this goal in mind, it is no wonder that the debate has 
8. As the term itself suggests, "shock therapy" conveys an image for how to 
cure a body politic of what ails it economically. It suggests attaching electrodes to 
the body and putting quite a bit of voltage through that body. It suggests, in 
other words, pain. Talbott Testimony, supra note 1, at 19. Some of the characteris-
tics of shock therapy include introducing free prices, eradicating subsidies, allowing 
inefficient state enterprises to go bankrupt, saving the salvageable by mass privat-
ization, and laying off excess workers. Shock therapists typically promise that the 
pain will only be temporary, and its short-term effects (unemployment, higher pric-
es, social dislocation, and economic instability) will be more than offset by the 
long-term benefits of a swift and unequivocal transition. 
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been narrowly framed in terms of revolution versus evolution. 
In fact, the term "transitional economy'' itself takes for granted 
not just the fact that the economy in question is making a 
"transition," but also the fact that it is making a transition to a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, an all-too-certain logic embodied in the 
"acceptable" economies of the United States, the European 
Union, and Japan. 
This Article will examine the Chinese model and explore 
why, despite its shortcomings, it still presents a feasible and 
plausible alternative to the more dominant model that inspired 
reforms in Eastern Europe. China's unique transitional path as 
well as its unique institutional arrangements present a wholly 
different alternative. This Article will argue that while eco-
nomic growth has certainly been fueled by the creation of a 
market-oriented, nonstate economy, such nonstate growth has 
also been generated by unorthodox market entities, such as 
collectives, with vague private property rights. Moreover, the 
retention of the state sector and the concomitant creation of a 
nonstate sector consisting of multiple property arrangements 
presents an additional challenge to the conventional prescrip-
tion that state sector privatization is always required. Accord-
ing to conventional prescription, because clear property rights 
are a prerequisite to producing efficient markets and generat-
ing economic growth, and because privatization is the best 
means with which this end can be achieved, state sector pri-
vatization is an absolute imperative for ailing transitional 
economies. 
Yet China departs from the dominant prescription for 
three reasons. First, it rejects immediate privatization of the 
state sector and encourages the initial creation of a new, 
nonstate sector. Second, it is making a transition to an econo-
my with different concepts of property rights and ownership. 
Third, the strategy it has adopted to arrive at that point is not 
complete state sector privatization but rather a gradual model 
consisting of three phases of reform, only the last of which 
involves some privatization of the state sector. Even then, the 
Chinese approach is limited state sector privatization which is 
diametrically opposed to the Eastern European model of mass 
privatization. In this context, Chinese privatization has 
evolved over time into three manageable sequences: the cre-
ation of a new, nonstate sector, the reformation of the existing 
state sector, and the privatization of the state sector. 
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·Part II of this Article describes the general framework of 
the privatization debate, and compares the dominant Eastern 
European model with the more novel Chinese model. It also 
examines the ideological and economic contexts in which both 
models were undertaken, focusing on the Chinese model and 
its theoretical underpinnings. Particular emphasis is placed on 
the economic benefits generated by the Chinese model and the 
economic rationale for deferring state sector privatization. 
Part III examines the first sequence of reform. Instituted 
since 1978, this sequence involves the creation of a nonstate 
sector coexisting on a parallel track with the state sector and 
consisting of multiple property arrangements: private enter-
prises, collective enterprises called township-village enterprises 
(TVEs),9 and foreign invested enterprises. Because the most 
significant and economi_cally productive enterprises within this 
nonstate sector universe are the TVEs, Part III focuses on 
these unorthodox entities and the implications to be drawn 
from their economic success. As decentralized state enterprises 
under the ownership and control of the local provincial or vil-
lage governments, their success is directly contrary to conven-
tional dogma on privatization. Part III will conclude that the 
success of TVEs demonstrates that clear private property ar-
rangements are not always required to generate economic 
growth and that markets can function without private owner-
ship as that term is traditionally understood. 
Part IV explores and assesses state sector reform in China. 
It first examines state sector reform in the absence of state 
sector privatization. These were reforms undertaken to im-
prove public sector efficiency and productivity in state enter-
prises without altering the foundation of the state's ownership 
rights. In this regard, this Article will examine the measures 
China took to induce its state enterprises to reorient their 
behavior, to favor innovation over routine and marketization 
over central planning. Part IV also examines the creation of a 
dual pricing system for state enterprises and the transfer and 
assignment of property use rights under a wide variety of con-
tracts. These property rights were transferred progressively 
from the state to the enterprise in order to allow: the latter 
9. While "collective enterprises" are not private enterprises, they are not con-
sidered state enterprises either. See infra text accompanying notes 109-13. 
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greater autonomy over management, marketing, and other 
decisions relating to the business. At the same time, manageri-
al reforms, including profit retention schemes and bonus plans 
adopted in the late 1970s and early 1980s, have also led to 
greater public sector efficiency and productivity. 
The second section of Part IV analyzes the current stage of 
Chinese state sector privatization, which is the gradual trans-
formation in ownership of state enterprises into a shareholding 
system by private equity participation. It is only in this last 
phase of reform that China has finally pursued privatization as 
it has been traditionally employed by transferring state owner-
ship rights to private interests. Part IV will also demonstrate 
that state sector privatization in China is wholly different from 
state sector privatization as adopted by Eastern Europe for the 
following reasons. First, state sector privatization in China is 
implemented only after a full-fledged nonstate sector has been 
created, so that transfer of ownership from state to private 
hands occurs in the context of an already highly-marketized 
framework. And second, state sector privatization in China is 
intended to be circumscribed, not widespread, in the number of 
enterprises to be privatized, the percentage of shares that can 
be privately owned, and the trading of those shares on the 
stock exchanges. 
Part IV will use as an example the recent securities issues 
of Chinese enterprises and examine how the development of a 
securities market in China is a reflection of the carefully cali-
brated choices of the Chinese government to engage in rather 
limited privatization of the state sector. In this regard, Part IV 
argues that state sector privatization has been uneven and 
that the government's preoccupation with remaining majority 
shareholder has created a securities market insufficiently re-
sponsive to the needs of other shareholders. The prescription 
for this ill, however, lies not in more or faster privatization, 
but in better privatization. Thus, if state sector privatization is 
to be instituted, it should include among its goals more than 
just the objectives of capital fundraising and state control of 
the securities market. 
Although it is a paradigm that currently dominates the 
privatization discourse, full, immediate and clear-cut privatiza-
tion is not desirable for all economies. The relative success of 
China's two-track model of privatization should invite serious 
consideration of alternative forms of privatization, as well as 
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economic diversity in so-called transitional economies. In addi-
tion, as the success of the TVEs show, if a market can be con-
structed and market oriented behavior induced, then uninhibit-
ed privatization of existing state institutions, given the social 
costs, may not be the prescription required or desired. 
II. FRIEND AND FOE; CONTRASTING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE 
STATE SECTOR IN CHINESE AND EASTERN EUROPEAN 
PRIVATIZATION ECONOMICS AND IDEOLOGY. 
A. Introduction 
Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the term "privatiza-
tion" has made a dramatic entrance into the emerging legal 
orders. Privatization has been accorded almost mystical status, 
as if its incantation will dissolve all difficulties inherent in 
reform and transition.10 However, despite its popular usage, 
the term "privatization" alone is so generalized as to be devoid 
of meaning if not grounded in the context ofwhere and when it 
is employed.11 For example, within the context of just one re-
10. Not only must reformers "move on all fronts at once-or not move at all," 
Lal Jayawardena, Preface to OLIVIER BLANCHARD ET AL., REFORM IN EASTERN 
EUROPE at vii, ix (1991), all fronts must additionally share one common goal-to 
reassign state ownership to private hands as quickly as possible. "The need to 
accelerate privatization is the paramount economic policy issue facing Eastern 
Europe. If there is no breakthrough in the privatization of large enterprises in the 
near future, the entire process could be stalled for years to come." Sachs, supra 
note 1, at 15; see also INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FuND, ET AL., THE ECONOMY OF 
THE USSR: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 26 (1990) ("the ultimate goal of 
ownership reform is to privatize almost all enterprises"); WORLD DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT 1991: THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT 144 (1991) ("Privatization is nec-
essary and highly desirable, even though difficult and time-consuming."). CATHER-
INE MANN ET AL., POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF ALTERNATIVE PRI-
VATIZATION SCHEMES 8 (Conference on Markets, States, and Democracy: The Politi-
cal Economy of Post-Communist Transformation, sponsored by the Center for Ger-
man and European Studies at the University of California, Berkeley and the 
Friedrich Ebert Stifftung (Feb. 11-13, 1993) Working Paper No. 5.14, 1993) ("Speed 
is important, since proceeding slowly risks allowing political opposition to develop 
that could weaken and perhaps unravel progress achieved to date."). 
11. On the other hand, at the other end of the spectrum of too general is too 
specific. Too much specificity can also cause one to throw up one's hands and 
conclude, simply, that "the French experience of privatization is unsuitable for 
Russia and Mexican lessons are useless for Eastern European, Cuban, Chinese and 
Vietnamese enterprises." Andrei Baev, Civil Law and the Transformation of State 
Property in Post-Socialist Economies: Alternatives to Privatization, 12 PAC. BASIN 
L.J. 131, 139 (1993). Thus, "we cannot push into the Procrustean bed all the dif-
ferent historical, legal, and economic forms of privatization." Id. Indeed, this ap-
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giop. or country, the definition of privatization is evolving con-
tinuously. 
[A]t its broadest level, the term 'privatization' refers merely 
to the introduction of some private enterprise into the econo-
my. For example, enacting a law which allows an artisan to 
become self employed is a form of privatization . . . . This 
meaning of privatization was relevant to developments in 
Eastern Europe less than three to five years ago. Now, how-
ever, for the most part Eastern European economies have 
moved far beyond these initial stages.12 
Indeed, at the current stage of the transformation process, 
"in the context of Eastern Europe, privatization means the 
transfer of state owned enterprises to private ownership .... 
For example, in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, the 
term privatization is generally used to refer to a specific pro-
gram for the wholesale divestment of state enterprises."13 
Moreover, privatization in emerging economies will be 
different from privatization in developed, market economies. 
For example, privatization in the more highly developed mar-
ket economies of Western Europe only entailed a sale of state 
assets to a more efficient private sector. It did not necessitate 
the restructuring or reconstruction of the economy.14 By con-
proach, if stretched to its limits, can result in the conclusion that unless initial 
conditions and structures were identical, the experience of one country is analyti-
cally meaningless if applied to another country. See, e.g., Jeffrey Sachs & Wing 
Thye Woo, Understanding the Reform Experiences of China, Eastern Europe and 
Russia, in FROM REFORM TO GROWTH: CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN TRANSI-
TION IN AsiA AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 23 (Chung H. Lee & Helmut 
Reisen eds., 1994). 
12. Richard M. Phillips & Marian G. Dent, Privatizing Eastern Europe: A 
Challenge for the Nineties, in JOINT VENTURES AND PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN 
EUROPE, at 445, 448 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series 
No. 575, 1991). 
13. There are, of course, differences within Eastern Europe itself. "In other 
states, which have not progressed as far towards a Western style economy (for 
example Romania and Albania), privatization may merely refer to the efforts of 
individual SOEs [state-owned enterprises] to introduce an element of private own-
ership or to create a joint venture with private firms." Id. at 448-49. 
14. ROMAN FRYDMAN & ANDRZEJ RAPACZTIISKI, PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN 
EUROPE: IS THE STATE WITHERING AWAY 21 (1994). Sales of British Airways, Brit-
ish Steel, British Telecom took place in a "fundamentally market environment 
dominated by private property." Id. Moreover, "prior to their privatization, state 
enterprises in ... Great Britain had to operate in competition with other private 
companies and their managerial system (even if often less efficient than that of 
their private analogues) was basically a product of the surrounding capitalist busi-
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trast, 
privatization, in the environment of the transitional econo-
mies, is not a simple transfer of ownership from the state to 
private individuals. It is rather a process by which the very 
institution of property, in the sense in which lawyers and 
economists employ the term, is reintroduced into East Euro-
pean societies.15 
107 
Thus, for all transitional economies, questions have arisen 
concerning not just the optimal pace of reform or the sequence 
of reform but also the type of property that reform is supposed 
to create. Should privatization of state enterprises be imple-
mented first? Or should a framework designed to induce mar-
ket-oriented behavior be adopted before state enterprises are 
transferred to private hands? 
In these two very basic aspects alone, the Eastern Europe-
an and Chinese models of privatization represent two unmis-
takably disparate strategies of reform. The Eastern European 
model favors quick privatization of state enterprises and in-
vests significant capital and resources into the conceptualiza-
tion and implementation of this process. The premise of the 
Eastern European model is that clear-cut private property 
rights are not just an inherent good but also a necessary pre-
condition for economic growth and efficiency. Because privat-
ization clarifies muddled property arrangements and transfers 
ownership rights from the state to private hands, privatization 
is considered necessary for the institution of a dynamic market 
economy. 
By contrast, the Chinese model favors retention of state 
enterprises and encourages the creation of a new set of firms 
in a distinct nonstate sector. A basic premise underlying the 
Chinese model is that the fundamentals of a market-oriented 
economy must be established before state sector privatization 
can be successfully pursued, if it is to be pursued at all. Thus, 
China's goal for many years has been the creation of a 
nonstate sector oriented towards the maximization of profits 
and the efficiency of production. 
Different ideological as well as economic considerations 
ness culture." Id. 
15. Id. at 10. 
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underlie the decision to adopt one model over the other. A 
political motive was fundamental to the decision by Eastern 
European countries to pursue a model founded on speedy and 
mass privatization of state owned enterprises. In a similar 
vein, an equally fundamental political impulse caused China to 
adopt a model that insulates the state sector from change and 
preserves, to the extent practical, vestiges of social ownership. 
This next section will focus on the ideological and econom-
ic means by which China has sought to privatize its economy, 
and as a point of contrast, compare the Chinese experience 
with the Eastern European model. 
B. Ideological Considerations: China and Eastern Europe 
To underscore China's shift from ideological purity to prag-
matism, Deng Xioaping once noted that yellow cat or white cat, 
it's a good cat if it catches mice.16 This paradigmatic shift al-
lowed China to adopt a series of reforms intended to reduce 
the role of central planning and extend the role of markets. 
While pragmatism has allowed China to create and use the 
market in a way that could not have been contemplated before 
1978, ideology has also ensured that such reforms will be kept 
within doctrinally acceptable parameters and will not displace 
the centrality of the state sector. Thus, a nonstate sector sepa-
rate from public ownership of the means of production was 
created and the state sector itself was retained. 
Public ownership of the means of production is still a cen-
16. Schell & Lappin, supra note 7, at 730. Addressing the seventh Plenum of 
the third Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League on July 7, 
1962, Deng Xiaoping said: 
As to what kind of relations of production is the best mode, I'm afraid 
we shall have to leave the matter to the discretion of local authorities, 
allowing them to adopt whatever mode of production that can facilitate 
quickest recovery and growth of agricultural production. The masses 
should also be allowed to adopt whatever mode they see fit, legalizing 
illegal practices as necessary. These are all tentative ideas, not final 
decisions, so they will not necessarily come to pass in the future. When 
talking about fighting battles, Comrade Liu Bocheng often uses this 
Sichuan popular saying: "It does not matter if it is a yellow cat or a 
black cat, as long as it catches mice." 
DENG XIAOPING, How to Recover the Agricultural Production, in, SELECTED WORKS 
OF DENG XlAOPING (1938-1965) 292, 293 (1992). 
This speech was used by Party conservatives to charge Deng Xiaoping with 
"going capitalist" and Deng was subsequently purged during the Cultural Revo-
lution. 
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tral tenet of Marxist theory. After the Communist revolution in 
1949, mass rural collectivizations and the restructuring of all 
businesses into state enterprises owned by all of the people 
were carried out under the banner of Marxist ideology.17 It 
was not until 1978 when Deng Xiaoping initiated an open door 
policy that China took the first of many incremental steps 
toward what has been called a "fourth revolution."18 This rev-
olution is characterized by a process of limited and controlled 
privatization with an "increasing market orientation . . . in 
ownership, production, investment, and demand[.]"19 
This fourth revolution is not characterized by any singular 
defining moment or violent shift along ideological fault lines on 
the scale of the Great Leap Forward or the Cultural Revolu-
tion. Rather, it is marked by subtle but persistent threads of 
reform which are revolutionary in implication but evolutionary 
in approach, designed to avoid disWusionment with change or 
pendulum politics and backlash.20 Thus, China's quest to em-
17. See Howard Chao & Yang Xiaoping, Private Enterprise in China: the De-
veloping Law of Collective Enterprises, 19 INT'L LAW. 1215, 1217 (1985) for a de-
scription of the process effected by the Chinese Communist Party between 1949 
and 1956, in which "nationalist capitalist enterprises" underwent "social transfor-
mation." 
See also ZHONGHUA RENMIN GoNGHEGUO XIANFA [Constitution] [XIANFA 
(1982)]. Article 6 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he basis of the socialist 
economic system of the People's Republic of China is socialist public ownership of 
the means of production, namely, ownership by the whole people and collective 
ownership by the working people." Id. art. 6. Article 7 further states that "[t]he 
state economy is the sector of socialist economy under ownership by the whole 
people; it is the leading force in the national economy." Id. art. 7. 
18. Gong, supra note 7, at 34. 
19. Id. at 30. 
20. By contrast, backlash in Eastern Europe has been occurring in recent 
months: 
In Russia, shock therapy had a backlash in December's parliamen-
tary elections, giving an antireformist, ultranationalist party a quarter of 
the vote. In Poland . . . the former Communists-standing for a slower 
reform platform in elections-became the largest party in Parliament. 
Similar results are expected in Hungary's spring elections, and in Roma-
nia and Bulgaria, the former Communists are gaining. 
Everywhere, the slow track to reform has an increasing appeal as 
more jobs disappear, prices rise, and living standards go on falling. 
Eric Bourne, East Europeans Feel Duped by the West's Promises of Aid, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 26, 1994, at 3. 
Because "poorly planned privatizations have done more harm than good," 
Eastern European governments have begun to question whether privatization is "a 
reform they can afford to skip." Tired of Capitalism? So Soon?, ECONOI\fiST, Jan. 
21, 1995, at 61. 
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bark on its fourth revolution and to construct the workings of a 
"socialist market economy'' have been guided by the defining 
criteria of ''balancing growth with stability, order with dyna-
mism, change with constancy."21 
"Socialism with Chinese characteristics" or "market social-
ism" thus accommodates both of China's stated objectives: to 
achieve economic growth through market reforms, and to bal-
ance growth with stability in order to generate change without 
rupture. Hence, there emerges the ideologically pragmatic 
mantra of "market socialism," controlling the hurly-burly of 
market within the familiar parameters of socialism. Not sur-
prisingly, ideological pragmatism has become the guiding prin-
ciple for China's reformers/2 who emphasize economic growth, 
increased efficiency, production before distribution,23 and mar-
21. Gong, supra note 7, at 35. 
China pledged to continue market-oriented reforms at the Communist Party 
Third Central Committee Plenum, but rejected shock therapy in favor of the "Chi-
na model," based more along the line of the "four little dragons," Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, than on American or European economic 
models. Daniel Kwan, Third Plenum's Agenda Revealed, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 
Oct. 5, 1993, at 8, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, SCHINA File. 
22. Under Deng Xiaoping, "practice [is] the sole criterion of truth." Gong, 
supra note 7, at 35. 
Deng Xiaoping's ideological pragmatism has percolated throughout Chinese 
society as well. A Chinese agriculture specialist recently asserted that Karl Marx 
had "'fully affirmed [the] viewpoint'" held by Adam Smith that supply and demand 
should be regulated through the "invisible hand" of the market. H. Lyman Miller, 
Holding the Deng Line, CHINA Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 22. Nowhere is this 
ideological pragmatism more freely exhibited than in China's embryonic but devel-
oping stock exchanges. According to Wei Wenyuan, chief executive of the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange, "when we think abo~t the development of our economy, we have 
stopped thinking about whether it is socialism or capitalism." Michael Hirsh, 
China's Financial Revolutionaries, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (int'l ed.), July 31, 
1993, at 43, 51. As Huang Guixian, an executive at Shanghai Shenyin Securities, 
said, "'We used to decide first if something new was socialist or capitalist .... 
Now we see whether it works, then decide whether it is socialist or capitalist.'" 
!d. 
23. Under "market socialism," emphasis shifted from distribution of resources 
to production of resources. As Winston Churchill so succinctly noted before the 
House of Commons, "the inherent vice of capitalism is the unequal sharing of 
blessings; the inherent virtue of socialism is the equal sharing of miseries." Maital 
& Milner, supra note 2, at 46. 
As early as 1978, the third plenary session of the 11th Chinese Communist 
Party Central Committee declared: "'To realize the four modernizations, it is neces-
sary to raise productive forces dramatically, and it is thus also necessary to 
change from various aspects the productive relations and superstructure which are 
incompatible with the growth of productive forces, and to change all unsuitable 
management styles, operational styles and ideological styles.'" Dissent, Official 
1995] THE CHINESE MODEL 111 
ket incentives, all within the ideologically comforting confines 
of central planning.24 
To date, market socialism has produced a marked shift 
towards the market in a country that, as recently as 1978, 
depended on its public sector to produce 78% of its industrial 
output. 25 AB discussed more fully in Part III, a nonstate sector 
was created and by 1992 alone was responsible for 52% of 
gross industrial output and more than 57% of nonagricultural 
employment. 26 In addition to creating a booming nonstate sec-
tor and a shrinking state sector,27 China has also managed to 
Journal Closed for Publishing Pro-Democracy Articles, British Broadcasting Corpo-
ration Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan. 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, News 
Library, TBBCSW File. 
24. In defending "market socialism," Deng Xiaoping stated, "'A planned econo-
my does not equal socialism, because planning also exists in capitalism. A market 
economy does not necessarily equal capitalism because the market also exists in 
socialism. In order to make socialism superior to capitalism, we must boldly take 
heed of and absorb all the accomplishments of civilization that the human race 
has achieved,' including 'all the advanced modes of operation and management 
developed by other countries.'" Schell & Lappin, supra note 7, at 729-30. 
25. Gong, supra note 7, at 31. By contrast, in 1979, the small-scale Chinese 
private sector provided only 23% of total industrial output. Guardiano, supra note 
1. 
26. Gong, supra note 7, at 31. If agricultural production and the service sector 
are counted, the private sector could be said to account for 75% of total economic 
output in China. Guardiano, supra note 1. By contrast, the state sector accounted 
for only 35% of the output of goods and services, a figure slightly above the gov-
ernment share in many European countries. Sir Alec Cairncross & Cyril Z. Lin, 
The Private Sector that Is Driving China, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1993, at 13. 
But it is not just the public sector that has shrunk. Beijing's financial dom-
inance over the provinces has as well. For example, while 80% of Guangdong's 
budget came from Beijing in 1980, in 1992, only two percent did. Gong, supra 
note 7, at 31. 
Another sign that Beijing has been willing to relinquish some degree of 
control over the economy can be seen in the ever diminishing share of the econo-
my that Beijing has been taking for its central coffers. As William Overholt, man-
aging director of Bankers Trust, Hong Kong, stated in his book, "[i]n a truly so-
cialist economy, such as China was at the beginning of reform, the government se-
questers a large fraction of gross national product (GNP) for its purposes. Near 
the other end of the spectrum, the capitalist, anti-tax U.S. and Hong Kong govern-
ments take less than one fifth of GNP. At the time reform was decreed in 1978, 
Beijing took almost 39%. By 1990, the central government's share of the economy 
was similar to that of Hong Kong." WILLIAM OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHINA 48 
(1993). 
27. "[T]he state enterprise sector has declined during the reform period from 
considerably more than half of the total economy to somewhat less than half." 
OVERHOLT, supra note 26, at 50. Macroeconomic reforms have occurred as well. 
Prices of nearly all products, except for a few basic necessities, have been freed to 
fluctuate according to supply and demand. One source estimates that only about 
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achieve a level of economic growth previously unparalleled for 
a country comprising one-fifth of the world's population.28 In 
addition to pure economic growth, China has also managed to 
achieve an unprecedented increase in foreign trade. This in-
crease has proceeded at a rate which signifies a shift from a 
position of radical self-reliance and isolation to a position of in-
creased integration into the international economy.29 
The numbers do not merely show that China experienced 
economic growth and increased productivity. More importantly, 
the figures show that economic growth and increased produc-
tivity occurred in the emerging nonstate sector.30 This strate-
12% of China's industrial output was subject to central planning in 1992. Paul 
Blustein, Can 'Half-Reformed' China Last?, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1993, at A27. 
28. China's growth rate after Deng Xiaoping's 1979 economic reform plan 
climbed to an annual rate of 10%. OVERHOLT, supra note 26, at 29. Although a 
brief decline to four percent occurred in 1988 and 1989 as a result of measures 
designed to arrest inflation, growth has accelerated to seven percent in 1991 and 
to 12.8% in 1992. Id. at 29-30. 
The seven percent growth rate, the rate that has characterized the "Asian 
miracle economies," id. at 30, at least until China's experience, has appeared to be 
a phenomenon largely confmed to either relatively small countries, such as Hong 
Kong (six million), Singapore (two million), Taiwan (20 million) or relatively homo-
geneous countries, such as South Korea and Japan. Id. at 27. 
29. By 1992, China's foreign trade rose to $166 billion and its exports in-
creased from $14.8 billion in 1979 to $85 billion in 1992. Id. Exports of sophisti-
cated goods increased as well, so that while manufactured goods accounted for 
only half of China's exports in 1985, they accounted for more than three quarters 
of all exports in 1991. Id. at 30-31. 
China's attempts to increase foreign investment through a well-calibrated 
system of incentives succeeded in attracting more than $20 billion of investment in 
its first dozen years of reform. Id. at 31. In 1992 alone, foreign investors invested 
$11.2 billion and signed agreements for $57.5 billion in future investments. Id. At 
the end of 1991, foreign-invested enterprises on Chinese soil generated $12.05 
billion of exports constituting almost 17% of China's total exports. Id. Indeed, for-
eign enterprises in China, which already account for a major share of China's 
GNP, are expanding by the phenomenal rate of 50% annually. Even in 1989, the 
year of Tiananmen, the rate of foreign enterprise investment in China declined 
only to 43%. Id. at 50. 
For a description of foreign-invested enterprises in China, see Michael J. 
Moser, Foreign Investment in China: The Legal Framework, in FOREIGN TRADE, IN-
VESTMENT AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 106-42 (Michael 
Moser ed., 1984) 
30. The emergence of a private sector outside the traditional state sector has 
also resulted in the marginalization of the once omnipotent Communist Party. As 
the Wall Street Journal reported, "[t]he economic opportunities since the party 
unfettered the economy in December 1978 have made money a rival to the party 
for people's attention." Joseph Kahn & Marcus Brauchli, China's Communists Face 
Serious Threat: Creeping Irrelevance, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 1994, at A9. While top 
college graduates once competed to become party members, they now scorn party 
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gy of privatization through the creation of a new nonstate sec-
tor, rather than the privatization of the existing state sector, is 
one of the more remarkable hallmarks of privatization in Chi-
na.al 
While this vibrant nonstate sector was being constructed, 
the state sector itself was steadfastly preserved. Unlike the 
countries of Eastern Europe, which desired to abandon their 
Communist past and return as swiftly as possible to the folds 
of free market Europe, China had no such political mandate. 
Paradoxically, the very institutional legacies that limit the 
parameters of political change, may also have diverted China 
from embarking on the route of radical marketization, possibly 
saving the country from the kind of economic cacophony that 
has plagued Russia. As a result, the double-edged sword that 
set limits on the very possibility for total political reinvention 
has also kept China from underestimating the necessity for 
maintaining stability. The desire to avoid traumatic transfor-
mation remains a foundation of the Chinese model of privatiza-
tion. 
Chinese privatization thus emerged gradually from and 
was shaped by "market socialism" or "socialism with Chinese 
characteristics." The state sector, which provides the underpin-
ning of the socialist system, could not be privatized without 
either undermining the very ideological foundation of Chinese 
socialism or risking substantial disruption in China's political, 
social, and economic system.32 Privatization in Communist 
membership. An entire new world has opened up in the flourishing private econo-
my and the old world offered by the party is dwindling into a sphere of irrele-
vance. 
31. Instead of focusing 
on the destruction of socialist institutions, namely central planning and 
state enterprises, China has concentrated on construction of market insti-
tutions, namely private enterprises, investment systems, stock and bond 
markets, workable price mechanisms, and most recently modern banks. If 
one defines the goal as decreasing the share of socialist production in 
GNP, then one can say that Poland has focused on decreasing the nu-
merator while China has focused on increasing the denominator. The 
denominator is more malleable, and increasing it expands popular wel-
fare. 
William Overholt, The Rise of China's Economy, Bus. ECON., Apr. 1994, at 29, 34. 
For an examination of Chinese privatization via state sector reform and 
private equity participation in state enterprises converted into joint stock compa-
nies, see discussion infra subparts IV.B.2 & B.3. 
32. What can or should be done about the decrepit and bankrupt state sector 
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China necessarily meant privatization by means other than 
transfer of state assets into private hands. Thus, against the 
more popular tide sweeping Russia and Eastern Europe, pri-
vatization in China must, by ideological necessity, mean pri-
vatization through the creation of a nonstate sector separate 
and distinct from the state. 
A completely different scenario can be found in the former 
Soviet bloc. As the Berlin Wall collapsed, the sense of political 
urgency and unlimited possibility spilled into the economic 
sector. All specters from the Communist past were to be elimi-
nated. The future was to be structurally and wholly reinvent-
ed, but in the image and likeness of the old Europe with which 
the Eastern bloc had once shared a common vision and from 
which it had mistakenly withdrawn. For the former Eastern 
bloc, immediate divestment of state ownership rights was a 
political, moral and, by implication, an economic good. 
Moreover, this divestment of state ownership rights was to 
be immediate because "the process of privatization entails 
enormous risks, and there [was] a real possibility that the 
process [w]ould still become paralyzed."33 Thus, in order to 
forestall political opposition from interest groups adversely 
affected by privatization such as labor unions, old Party mem-
bers, and former owners intent on reclaiming their property, 
privatization had to be implemented as swiftly as possible in 
order to prevent its opponents from "get[ting] their tentacles 
around the state enterprises." 
Moreover, the appeal of immediate state sector privatiza-
tion lies not in its unambiguous rupture with the past, but in 
its steering of the economy in a direction which has great polit-
ical appeal. Because market economies worked well in the 
West, because central planning did not work in the East, and 
because there was no time to experiment with alternative 
paths, the headlong rush to a Western-style economy has an 
understandable attraction. Because stripping the state of own-
ership rights is seen as the quickest path towards such an 
is a question that haunts reformers in China. See discussion infra parts IV.B.1 & 
B.2. 
For China, in particular, a country of approximately 1,152,428,417 individu-
als in approximately 300,388,130 households in 22 provinces and five autonomous 
regions and three special municipalities, see Gong, supra note 7, at 30, the risk 
for social unrest and dislocation cannot be minimized. 
33. Sachs, supra note 1, at 16. 
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economy, privatization has been considered a prerequisite to a 
successful transition. 
Thus, while each country in Eastern Europe might have 
adopted a different privatization strategy,34 most embraced 
the privatization of state enterprises as the linchpin of market 
reform. Privatization has unrealistically been seen as a pana-
cea for unmanageable bureaucracy, inefficiency, and bankrupt-
cy. Because innovation, efficiency, growth, and incentives are 
believed to be magical properties somehow associated with 
"privatization," it is believed that the process alone will convert 
losses into profits, albeit with a certain number of social and 
political costs. In Poland, for example, "the government posi-
tion is that privatization . . . should precede enterprise restruc-
turing."35 Similarly, "[c]onsidering it more important to pri-
vatize state property quickly than to finalize all the details of a 
market economy," the Czech Republic announced as early as 
1993 that it planned to privatize 2,100 state enterprises worth 
approximately $17 billion.36 Even though it is acknowledged 
34. See Michele Balfour & Cameron Crise, A Privatization Test: The Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Poland, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 84 (1993) (privatization in 
the Czech Republic primarily by the voucher coupon method-selling voucher cou-
pon booklets to be used by eligible citizens for bidding of shares in state firms 
and direct sales to foreign investors; privatization in Slovakia by public tenders, 
public auctions, direct sales and to a lesser degree, the distribution of shares 
through coupon privatization; privatization in Poland through privatization coupons 
and investment funds); see also Sachs, supra note 1, at 18-25 (privatization by 
initial public offerings, transfer of ownership to insiders, outsider privatization and 
sales and transfers to financial intermediaries). 
35. Sachs, supra note 1, at 15 n.1 (emphasis added). 
36. Balfour & Crise, supra note 34, at 96. 
This naive belief in the emerging market economies, encouraged on occa-
sion by enthusiasts from the West, is that, with the large state-owned 
enterprises, all that is needed is to change the ownership from the state 
to private persons. The motivation of the new owners would engender 
those efficient systems of production so characteristic of the West and so 
lacking in the East. 
Sir Alan Walters, The Transition to a Market Economy, in THE EMERGENCE OF 
MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 102-03 (Christopher Clague & Gordon C. 
Rausser eds., 1992). 
Hence, there was a lack of meaningful pre-privatization restructuring of the 
type occurring in China. 
There was thought to be no point in trying to reform the existing state-
owned enterprises while they remained in state ownership . . . . One of 
the enduring features of all emerging market economies, whatever their 
state of reform, has been the persistence of nomenklatura management. 
It is doubtful that any political leader in Eastern Europe will seriously 
attempt the Herculean task of sorting the sheep from the goats among 
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that other ingredients are needed to implement a workable pri-
vate market economy, it is also widely believed that the change 
from state to private ownership itself will result in the creation 
of a well-functioning capital market.37 
Western institutions such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund have further encouraged state 
sector privatization and, in some cases, made it a prerequisite 
for further financial assistance.38 For example, the prescrip-
tion for the former Soviet Union stated that "the ultimate goal 
of ownership reform is to privatize almost all enterprises."39 
Furthermore, the World Bank concluded that "privatization is 
necessary and highly desirable, even though difficult and time-
consuming."40 The reason, of course, for placing so much faith 
in privatization is that it has been assumed that "only private 
owners can establish an enduring basis for self-financing and 
managerial independence."41 
Thus, preprivatization restructuring could not be as impor-
tant as privatization itself. Again, ideology plays a large part 
in this determination. State firms were seen as vestiges from 
the past and were associated with inefficiency and 
unprofitability. Restructuring them was not as politically ap-
pealing as turning them over to private owners who could do a 
much better job of converting struggling enterprises into com-
mercial viabilities. Thus, enterprise reform lies at the low end 
of the agenda, while sweeping transfer of state property rights 
the nomenklatura. They hope, instead, that privatization will do the sort-
ing for them. 
Id. at 103. 
37. While various additional measures such as the institution of bankruptcy 
procedures to facilitate enterprise liquidation, "legal guidelines and procedures of a 
normal corporation," or "[b]asic concepts of property management" are recommend-
ed, these measures are designed to accompany, not precede, state sector privatiza-
tion. Sachs, supra note 1, at 28. 
38. See, e.g., John A. Peeler, Alarm Bell for Third-World Democracies, CHRIS· 
TIAN Scr. MONITOR, Mar. 13, 1992, at 19 (because pro-privatization policies of the 
IMF are part of the politically dominant prescriptions for ailing economies, govern-
ments such as Third World governments have no choice but to adopt such poli-
cies). 
39. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND ET AL., supra note 10, at 26. 
40. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1991: THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT, 
supra note 10, at 144. 
41. Kimio Uno, Privatization and the Creation of a Commercial Banking Sys-
tem, in WHAT Is TO BE DONE? PROPOSALS FOR THE SOVIET TRANSITION TO THE 
MARKET 150 (Merton Peck & Thomas Richardson eds., 1991). 
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to private owners remains at the top. 
That is not to say, of course, that no attempts have been 
made to improve state enterprises before they are privatized. 
Nor has privatization been the only method of reform in East-
ern Europe. After all, even the most ardent advocates of pri-
vatization admit that while it is "the key element of the trans-
formation process,"42 "complementary policy initiatives and 
success in other areas, such as the legal environment, macro-
economic policy, and financial and labor markets are required 
to achieve the ultimate objectives."43 However, wholesale, im-
mediate state sector privatization remains the centerpiece of 
the Eastern European model. Even though it may be but one 
part of a complex endeavor to construct a market economy, the 
overall package is still one that requires the immediate intro-
duction of fr~e prices, the removal of subsidies, and the imple-
mentation of traditionally recognizable private property rights. 
Thus, even a perfunctory comparison of the Eastern Euro-
pean with the Chinese moael will reveal stark differences. In 
all respects, China's method of privatization goes against the 
dogmatic prescription for privatization ordained by Westem 
reformers. Although embraced by Eastern Europe, immediate 
privatization of existing state enterprises, traditionally con-
sidered to be a prerequisite for a truly reformed economy, has 
been rejected by China. 
42. MANN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1. • 
43. Id. 
In addition, while state sector privatization remains the dominant method of 
creating a market economy and demands significant investment in resources and 
capital from the government, there is also no denying the existence of a private 
sector in Eastern Europe. When the governments of Poland, Hungary, and Czecho-
slovakia permitted the formation of private companies in 1989 and 1990, the re-
sponse was indeed positive. For example, the numbers of registered private enter-
prises increased in Poland between 1989 and 1991 to 45,000. Leila Webster, Pri-
vate Sector Manufacturing in Eastern Europe: Some Cross-Country Comparisons, in 
CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMIES: PRIVATIZATION IN POST-COMMUNIST AND REFORM-
ING COMMUNIST STATES 177 (Vedat Milor ed., 1994). 
Still, the private sector accounts for only a small percentage of economic 
output-one half of one percent of non-agricultural output in Czechoslovakia and 
eight percent in Poland. Lawrence Summers, The Next Decade in Central and 
Eastern Europe, in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, 
supra note 36, at 29. The Polish private sector has grown from "15,000 in 1989 to 
more than 61,000 by March 1993" despite the government's lack of attention to 
fostering its growth. David Gordon, Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Polish 
Experience, 25 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 517, 552 (1994). 
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Instead, China has opted for a model founded on the cre-
ation of a nonstate sector. This model is occasionally described 
derisively as only a "traditional form of privatization [which] 
occurs when the state withdraws altogether from certain eco-
nomic activities and creates an opportunity for private entre-
preneurs to act in such fields."44 Precisely because most com-
mentators believe that the "mere" introduction of private en-
terprise into the economy is only privatization in its initial, 
traditional stage,45 the Chinese model, with its emphasis on a 
new, enterprising nonstate sector, is all the more uncommon. 
In effect, it represents a complete rejection of the orthodox 
view of privatization.46 As more fully described below, in Chi-
na, the immediate privatization of state enterprises is viewed 
neither as a necessary economic corollary to the institution of 
market-oriented behavior, nor deemed worthy of the political 
and social costs that would inevitably accompany such a pro-
cess. 
Because of the sense of historical and economic imperative 
that has swept Eastern Europe, the Chinese approach probably 
would not have been palatable there. However, while the Chi-
nese model may not be an ideologically feasible or politically 
appealing alternative, the uncontested economic success it has 
produced should present some evidence against the more domi-
nant Eastern European paradigm. 
44. Tamas Horvath, State Shrinkage in Hungary in the 1980s, in PRIVATIZA-
TION AND DEREGULATION IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 413 (Dennis J. Gayle & Jona-
than N. Goodrich eds., 1990) (emphasis added). 
45. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
46. Under the orthodox view, privatization is desirable not just because it cre-
ates the correct market incentives in the newly privatized firms but also because 
it serves to clarify muddled property relations and rights. As some have observed, 
[t]o a western-trained economist, the centrality and immediacy to any 
transformation process of establishing well-defined property seems so self 
evident as to hardly merit discussion. It is little wonder that, leaving 
aside the sometimes more immediate issues of macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion, the officially sanctioned position of Western governments and inter-
national lending organizations places the highest priority on the aggres-
sive and rapid establishment of well-defined property rights. 
MARTIN WEITZMAN & CHENGGANG XU, VAGUELY DEFINED COOPERATIVES AND COOP-
ERATIVE CULTURE: A RECONCILIATION OF A PARADOXICAL PHENOMENON IN TRANSI-
TIONAL ECONOMIES 2 (Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper 
No. 1607, 1992). 
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C. Social and Economic Considerations: China Compared to 
Eastern Europe 
At the heart of Chinese privatization is a prosperous and 
thriving nonstate economy tenuously connected to the state 
sector yet free from its grip.47 Even though China's ideological 
quandary might have forced the country's reformers to initially 
channel the tide of privatization into the creation of a nonstate 
sector48 as a supplement to the more dominant state sector, 
47. Because privatization of the state sector is a process separate from the 
creation of a private sector, both analytically distinct phenomena should be evalu-
ated independently of one another. Thus, because there are costs -attached to both 
the privatization of state sector institutions and the creation of a private sector, a 
transitional economy may be faced with a tradeoff-the difficult choice of doing 
what when. 
For example, "the creation of a commercial code is probably more important 
to the new entrepreneurs who are building new commercial relationships and who 
do not have the backing of the state, than to the state sector firms with their 
traditional ties." Peter Murrell, Evolution in Economics and in the Economic Re· 
form of the Centrally Planned Economies, in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONO-
MIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 36, at 35, 51 n.32. Thus, a tradeoff occurs 
when, the creation of a private sector framework conducive to entry of new firms 
receives lower priority in state resources than the creation of state sector privat-
ization schemes. 
48. There are generally four categories of firms in the non-state sector: indi-
vidually owned firms, foreign-invested firms, TVEs, and urban collectives. See 
SHANG-JIN WEI & PENG LIAN, LOVE AND HATE: STATE AND NON-STATE FIRMS IN 
TRANSITION ECONOMIES (Center for Pacific Basin Monetary and Economic Studies, 
Economic Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 
Pacific Basin Working Paper Series No. PB 93-10, 1993). Only the first two are 
completely privately owned. Individually owned firms, whether rural or urban, 
consist primarily of enterprises subsumed under the categories of "private econo-
my" and "individual economy." See infra note 135 for an account of the status of 
the private economy and the individual economy in China and the Chinese Consti-
tution. For an account of the development of the foreign-invested enterprise in 
China, see MARGARET PEARSON, JOINT VENTURES IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA (1991); see generally Moser, supra note 29. Article 18 of the 1982 Constitu-
tion provides that "[t]he People's Republic of China permits foreign enterprises, 
other foreign economic organizations and individual foreigners to invest in China 
and to enter into various forms of economic co-operation with Chinese enterprises 
and other economic organizations in accordance with the law of the People's Re-
public of China." ZHONGHUA RENMIN GoNGHEGUO XIANFA [Constitution] [XIANFA 
(1982)) art. 18. 
Because of the protean and obscure state of property rights in China, the 
focus of this paper is not on how certain enterprises are officially or nominally 
categorized by the Chinese authorities. Indeed, as Pradumna Rana, senior econo-
mist of the Asian Development Bank once remarked, "'enterprises [still] operate in 
a sort of limbo between public and private ownership, with rights and responsibili-
ties of management and ownership unclear in both practice and law.'" Ramon 
Isberto, China Development: From Boom to Bust?, Inter Press Service, May 11, 
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there are socioeconomic reasons to support this model as well. 
Socialist ideology may have dictated this particular path of 
reform. Nevertheless, this method of privatization has allowed 
China to create a market-oriented sector, while freeing it from 
the socially disruptive task of dismantling the gargantuan and 
dinosaurish state sector.49 
Indeed, advocates of the shock therapy school of reform 
have sought to cast China's experience in a negative light by 
highlighting the fact that the Chinese path is more a product 
of constraint than of deliberative strategy.50 These advocates 
contend that China's reformers were forced by political divi-
sions within the Communist Party to operate within the con-
text of "socialism with Chinese characteristics," and that there-
fore, China's model of reform was ''happened upon" through 
pure serendipity. They argue that it is a model thrust upon 
China by a deficit of choice and a lack of both vision and con-
sensus. Saddled with such illegitimate origins, China's method 
of privatization is no model at all because it cannot fairly be 
called a true strategy of reform. 
Whether it is a model or an accident, it cannot be denied 
that the Chinese experience challenges economic dogma and 
presents legitimate alternatives for other transitional econo-
mies.51 True, Chinese privatization may have had its origins 
1994, auailable in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, INPRES File. This Article's focus, 
therefore, is not on the ambiguity of boundaries that exist between different types 
of firms but rather on a very unambiguous phenomenon-the rise of a sector 
which has led to a decrease in the importance of the state sector and an increase 
in productivity in a sphere outside the control of the state. In addition, it should 
be noted that the terms "private sector" and "nonstate sector" are used inter-
changeably in this Article and that privately owned firms, foreign-invested enter-
prises, TVEs, and urban coiiectives are ail considered to be in the private or non-
state sector (although only the first two are truly privately owned). 
49. By contrast, the struggle for ownership claims has taken center stage in 
Russia. The campaign for privatization was launched even though conflicting 
claims for ownership by groups other than the state (for example, managers, work-
ers, municipal officials) were being waged. See Louis Uchiteiie, East's Problems in 
Going Priuate, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1992, at D2. 
The model spearheaded by China would defer state sector privatization until 
a private sector has been created with the capacity to generate enough growth 
both to overtake the state sector and to absorb some of the social disruptions 
state sector reform would unleash. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 
50. See, e.g., Sachs & Woo, supra note 11, at 31-33. 
51. Whether or not the Chinese model should be an antidote or an alternative 
to "shock therapy," its success at the very least indicates that before countries 
such as Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea, Russia and others from the ex-Soviet Union 
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in the dictates of China's political imperatives. However, this 
alone does not mean that it is irrelevant to other transitional 
economies or that it is somehow stripped of all social and eco-
nomic legitimacy. 
Rather, there are three primary socioeconomic benefits to 
be derived from the deferral of state sector privatization in 
favor of first creating a nonstate sector. First, given the inevi-
table economic tradeoffs involved in the transition process, it 
may be more beneficial for transitional economies to devote 
limited resources to favor the creation of a new, nonstate sec-
tor over privatization of the state sector. Second, given the 
social costs and disruption that inevitably accompany state 
sector privatization, it may make more social sense to establish 
a new, nonstate sector vibrant enough to absorb some of the 
dislocation when and if state sector privatization is implement-
ed. Third, given the fact that state sector privatization may not 
be effective unless a market framework already exists, the 
sequencing of reform may need to be reversed so that the es-
tablishment of a market framework should take precedence 
over the mass transfer of ownership rights. 
There are sound economic reasons for committing econom-
ic and creative resources to the creation of a market frame-
work rather than the adaptation or destruction of the state 
sector. Indeed, given the fact that limited resources are avail-
able, some economists have noted that 
too many hopes have been invested in privatization and rath-
er too much intellectual, social, and political capital is being 
consumed in the process of privatization. The argument is 
strengthened when the efforts behind privatization are con-
trasted to the lack of attention being paid to creating and fos-
tering the development of new private sector firms.52 
Thus, while some economists have acknowledged that true 
innovation and growth can come only from the emergence of a 
new private sector rather than the restructuring of established 
state enterprises, such "emphases are not the major focus of 
become testing grounds for "shock therapy," this all-too-common prescription for 
ailing transitional economies should be subjected to further scrutiny. 
52. Murrell, supra note 47, at 45. "In many Eastern European countries, poli-
cy toward the private sector can be characterized, at best, as one of benign ne-
glect." Id. 
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the majority of discussions of the transition process."53 
Because the privatization debate has been defined by the 
desires and experiences of the former Soviet bloc to reenter the 
family of Europe, alternative approaches to privatization have 
been excluded from the possibilities drawn by the more domi-
nant Eastern European model. Thus, although the predica-
ments of certain developing countries are similar enough to the 
transitional economies of China and Eastern Europe to war-
rant comparison,54 the commonalities in their experiences 
have not been adequately noted. For instance, despite the 
obvious differences in institutional structure of the market in 
the two regions, the desire for increased production and great-
er productivity have meant that "[i]n each instance, institu-
tions must be adapted or created to generate new earnings 
streams."55 In those developing countries where reform has 
been more or less successful, "growth has taken place primari-
ly through the emergence of new activities, not through the 
adaptation of older ones."56 
Because Eastern Europe has focused on the privatization 
of existing state enterprises, 
the biggest drawback Eastern Europe may have is an under-
standable but nonetheless misplaced fixation on the old as-
sets .... 
Important questions are what the old assets are worth 
and whether they are worth enough to be occupying as much 
time, attention and scarce' resources of politicians, finance 
ministries and ministries of ownership as they have, in fact, 
been given.57 
The administrative complexities of valuation alone have made 
it difficult to assign a market value to assets which have previ-
ously had none.58 Because accounting systems employed by 
53. "[l]t is quite unusual to find authors who emphasize the costliness of the 
privatization process and the need to slow down this process in order to channel 
resources to the new private sector." Id. at 48 n.18. 
54. See Anne Krueger, Institutions for the New Private Sector, in THE EMER· 
GENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 36, at 219, 219-23. 
55. Id. at 220. 
56. Id. at 221. Growth in Turkey and Korea, for example, occurred primarily 
from emerging economic activities, not from privatization or adaptation of old ones. 
Id. at 221-22. 
57. Id. at 222. 
58. For a detailed discussion of valuation problems and suggested solutions, 
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centrally planned economies are simply not transferable to 
market economies, they give at best an inadequate and unreli-
able value of the state enterprises at issue. A wholesale adop-
tion of generally accepted accounting principles takes time to 
implement. Thus, state sector privatization will have to initial-
ly proceed with accounting standards devised on a case-by-case 
basis.59 In the absence of a mature market and a developed 
pricing system, valuation is unreliable, time consuming, and 
expensive. For example, "the high valuation fees charged by 
foreign accounting and auditing companies have become a 
political problem in Poland."60 
State enterprises saddled with debt must either have that 
debt forgiven or restructured. Market prospects for such firms 
have to be reevaluated. These are not easy tasks given the 
uncertainties in Eastern Europe.61 These difficulties are com-
pounded by the fact that valuation methods for the very same 
firm may produce inconsistencies. To sidestep some of these 
difficulties, formal valuations have occasionally been bypassed 
and the purchase price subjected to an after-sale adjustment, 
when market conditions have been clarified.62 
Aside from valuation costs, there are also high transaction 
costs given the large amount of time, energy, and resources 
that must be devoted to devising and administering mass pri-
vatization campaigns. The multiplicity of schemes, for example, 
include public offerings, public auctions, sales to private buyers 
or institutional investors (such as banks or financial intermedi-
aries), buyouts by insiders (including management), and res-
titution actions by former owners. 
Moreover, in Eastern Europe, the utter lack of domestic 
capital has created the political and economic dilemma of how 
see Robert J. Toltzman, Valuation Issues-Problems and Solutions, in 
BU'ITERWORTHS PRIVATISATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 61 (Stephen A. 
Rayner ed., 1992); Gordon, supra note 43, at 531-33. These valuation problems, 
combined with political and social insecurity, caused foreign investors to shy away 
from purchasing Polish companies. Balfour & Crise, supra note 34, at 113. 
59. Hans J. Blommenstein et al., Priuatising Large Enterprises: Oueruiew of 
Issues and Case Studies, in CENTRE FOR CO-OPERATION WITH THE EUROPEAN ECON-
Ol\nES IN TRANSITION & ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT, METHODS OF PRIVATISING LARGE ENTERPRISES 16 (1993). 
60. Jan Szomburg, Poland: Country Study, in METHODS OF PRIVATISING LARGE 
ENTERPRISES, supra note 59, at 97. 
61. Blommestein, supra note 59, at 16. 
62. Id. 
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to sell assets to domestic buyers who have no capital; hence 
the quandary between efficiency and equity. To maximize the 
goals of efficiency, state assets must be transferred to those 
most capable of increasing their efficiency. To generate much 
needed capital, state assets must be sold to those with suffi-
cient capital to purchase such assets. The conflict, of course, 
arises when those with the requisite managerial expertise and 
capital pool are unlikely to be citizens and much more likely to 
be foreigners. 
Most Eastern European countries have adopted the politi-
cally appealing voucher system, which involves the free dis-
tribution ofvouchers to citizens who can in turn exchange such 
vouchers for shares in the privatized enterprises. While the 
dispersion of vouchers creates equitable and widespread pri-
vate ownership and at the same time permits Eastern Europe 
to avoid valuation difficulties, such benefits may have come at 
the expense of efficiency. Domestic owners lack the necessary 
capital to continue investing in the privatized firms as well as 
the management know-how to create new markets and en-
hance efficiency. The wide dispersion of vouchers may have 
also created a diluted shareholding system without any true 
ownership interest. Therefore, Eastern Europe has devised a 
scheme whereby such vouchers can be traded for shares in 
financial intermediaries, which, like Western holding compa-
nies, may either own the entire privatized enterprises, or, like 
Western mutual funds, may own a certain percentage of shares 
in the privatized enterprises. However, under either scenario, 
the costs are certainly not negligible. Such mass privatization 
schemes can be complex and cumbersome to regulate and ad-
minister and may require the involvement of a multiplicity of 
institutions including voucher agents, stock exchanges, and 
investment funds. 
Thus, limited financial and creative resources may be 
better utilized if they are devoted to the creation of institutions 
that foster the rapid emergence of a private sector.63 A further 
economic tradeoff between privatizing the state sector and 
creating a new nonstate sector exists, for example, in the di-
version of limited resources from one goal to the other. Thus, 
63. Krueger, supra note 54, at 222-23. Commercial codes, legal procedures, 
and a tax collection system are necessary in the framework of incentives to foster 
the growth of small businesses. 
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any surplus generated by the state sector during the transi-
tional period can be used either to devise auction schemes, 
outright sales, or voucher distribution, or it can be used by the 
state to finance the growth of new companies. 
The Chinese experience represents this latter approach. In 
China, there is undoubtedly a clear and demonstrable correla-
tion between the growth of a dynamic nonstate sector and the 
success of China's economic reform.64 More importantly, the 
proliferation of a nonstate sector in China seems to have been 
stimulated by the initial presence of state firms. To develop its 
nonstate sector, China simply removed barriers to entry, thus 
permitting private initiatives to take root while leaving its 
state sector firms more or less intact. Instead of being con-
strained by existing state enterprises, however, these private 
businesses seemed to have benefited from the presence of the 
state sector. 
In fact, a study of 434 Chinese cities revealed that in the 
initial phases of reform, state firms appeared to have promoted 
and stimulated the growth of nonstate firms.65 Like other cen-
trally planned economies, the purchase of inputs and the sale 
of outputs in China tend to remain intertwined with the cen-
tralized network of the old central planning system, despite 
efforts to extricate the economy from the dictates of the plan. 
Thus, once the state takes steps to enable private businesses to 
form, and once private businesses do in fact manage to enter 
the economic mainstream, instead of having to sink or swim, 
they find themselves in the enviable position of not having to 
worry about input supply and output market. Because state 
firms are already involved in the "downstream and upstream 
of the production process,"66 an established market for pur-
chases and sales exists. Thus, the state firms' demand for new 
products alone may be crucial for the continued viability of 
newly emerging private firms.67 
64. Like China, Taiwan and Korea have both transformed their state-domi-
nated economies not by privatizing state firms but primarily by giving birth to 
firms outside the state sectors. See WEI & LIAN, supra note 48, at 3 n.2. 
65. Id. at 4. 
66. Id. at 5. 
67. The mere announcement of a privatization program for state enterprises 
tends to result in significant decline in output, because workers and managers 
whose jobs are threatened no longer are motivated to continue their current level 
of production. This lack of motivation could retard the growth of new private 
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By contrast, "if one closes the state firms all at once at the 
beginning of a reform, the existing interfirm production chains 
are also severed."68 In other words, the sudden withdrawal of 
the state may create a gap in the production and distribution 
·chain that may take years for private businesses to fill. Of 
course, hypothetically, all entrepreneurs could form new busi-
nesses to generate demand for each other's supplies and to 
provide mutual production and distribution chains.69 Howev-
er, this scenario is unlikely to happen, and therefore the "econ-
omy can be stuck in a nongrowth equilibrium."70 Once a pri-
vate sector has emerged, however, the authors of this study 
concluded that the dismantling of inefficient state firms should 
indeed begin.71 
The peculiar dynamics created by a state sector initially 
coexisting with an emerging nonstate sector may also give the 
newly-established private firms the advantage of "free-riding 
on the social safety net" financed and borne by the old state 
sector.72 For example, while a state owned firm pays between 
45% and 55% of its profits in income tax, a nonstate sector 
enterprise, such as a township village enterprise, pays only 
35% while foreign-invested firms pay only 15% if they are 
located in specially designated economic zones.73 Thus, a Chi-
nese family will often have one person working in the state 
sector to secure social welfare benefits provided by the state74 
firms, which would no longer be aided by the interfirm linkage provided by state 
sector firms. Id. at 6-7. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 8. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 6. China is currently at the stage where the authors of this study 
believe it is in fact time to undertake genuine reform of the state sector. See infra 
notes 223-37 and accompanying text. 
72. WEI & LIAN, supra note 48, at 8. 
73. Id. at 9 n.5. 
74. State enterprises have traditionally provided workers with comprehensive 
benefit packages such as pensions, subsidized housing, medical care, child care, 
food, and recreation facilities. Interestingly enough, proponents of "shock therapy" 
have used this very fact-the generous state sector benefits-to explain why a 
country like Russia has not been able to encourage workers to leave the comforts 
of the state sector for the less secure private sector. As Sachs and Woo explained, 
because Russia's workers are primarily urban and employed by state enterprises 
which also act as social welfare providers, and because, unlike China, Russia does 
not have a huge agricultural sector with surplus labor willing to move from the 
rural economy to the new nonstate or private economy, Russia has had no choice 
but to take the bitter medicines of "shock therapy" reform. See Sachs & Woo, 
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and another person working in the private sector to generate 
higher income. 75 As the Chinese experience demonstrates, 
even after market-supportive measures have been instituted, 
the state sector may very well play a beneficent role in the 
emergence of private-oriented businesses. 
There is yet an additional reason to defer state sector 
privatization. The state cannot simply afford to withdraw from 
the economic foreground, for, as the paradox has been noted 
even by the more ardent proponents of privatization, "the most 
important aspect of the transition to a spontaneously function-
ing market economy cannot be initiated by m·arket forces 
themselves. Indeed, the only force powerful enough to set the 
market forces in motion is the very state that is supposed to 
remove itself from the picture."76 
The economic benefits of the Chinese model are clear, but 
the social benefits are equally compelling. Instead of eradicat-
ing the state sector from the economy, China has opted to 
reconfigure its economic universe through a combination of 
state and nonstate sector economies.77 The synergy derived 
supra note 11, at 25. But see Barry Naughton, Reforming a Planned Economy: Is 
China Unique?, in FROM REFORM TO GROWTH: CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN 
TRANSITION IN AsiA AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 11, at 49, 67-
68. 
75. WEI & LIAN, supra note 48, at 9 n.6. 
76. FRYDMAN & RAPACYNZSKI, supra note 14, at 57. 
During the early stage of reform, when monitoring mechanisms, banking 
regulation, securities regulation, and accounting standards are either absent or 
ineffective, the decision has to be made as to who "is to exert the necessary de-
gree of control over the actions of economic agents in order to preserve budgetary, 
financial, and monetary stability during the early stages of reform." Murrell, supra 
note 47, at 50. Either the free market or existing state institutions can be used 
"on a selective and temporary basis to exert control over the state enterprises in 
the period before privatization and creation of market institutions." Id. 
77. Is China's model portable to other transitional economies or is it grounded 
in structures and conditions that are specifically Chinese? Some economists have 
argued that Chinese privatization took the shape it did primarily because the 
relatively small size of the state sector allowed reformers to ignore or defer state 
sector privatization and focus on private sector creation. See generally, e.g., Sachs 
& Woo, supra note 11. 
Under this theory, the following initial but unique conditions made China's 
model workable: a small state sector and a large agricultural sector with a surplus 
reservoir of agricultural workers. This combination enabled the government to 
perform the relatively easy task of shifting labor from the rural economy to the 
newly formed private sector and avoid th.e more difficult task of populating the 
new private sector with state sector workers siphoned from the generously subsi-
dized state sector, which the government would have had to do had China not 
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from this interaction allows China to avoid collapse caused by 
the destruction of the old economy before alternative market 
forces can be introduced. By virtue of this dual-track approach, 
transition costs and instability can be kept at a minimum 
because the preserved state sector is able to provide a kind of 
social and economic anchor during the tumultuous beginnings 
of the market. Further, the newly emerging private sector can 
in turn act as a shock-absorber if and when the state sector is 
privatized. 78 
Aside from the social and economic considerations de-
scribed above, creating a nonstate sector before destroying the 
state sector might be a more effective means than mass privat-
ization at fostering competition, efficiency, and market-sup-
portive institutions. The Chinese model thus focuses on how to 
create market forces, not how to transfer state assets to pri-
vate hands. And the implication, of course, is that unless mar-
ket institutions have been created and secured, privatization of 
the state sector is ineffective. 
In this very fundamental respect, then, the Chinese model 
is diametrically opposed to the Eastern European model. East-
ern European faith in state sector privatization rests on the 
premise that the change from state to private ownership itself 
is the necessary trigger to catalytically construct a market 
economy. Starting from that premise, the following prescrip-
tion makes perfect sense. "[W]ithout privatisation no mean-
ingful market conditions could begin to exist."79 Under this 
been "blessed" with such a large pool of unemployed and unskilled peasant work-
ers. 
To explain why Russia could not have adopted China's model, the following 
Russian conditions were noted: heavy state subsidies of both state-owned farms in 
Russia and state-owned industries. Thus, workers from neither sector would have 
been willing to move from their heavily subsidized enterprises into the new, 
nonsecure, nonsubsidized, nonstate sector-unless state sector subsidies were either 
drastically reduced or eliminated. Russia, therefore, did not have access to a ready 
reservoir of surplus workers to shift into a newly legalized private economy. More-
over, because the Russian state sector was so large, Russian privatization had to 
start with state sector privatization. 
78. However, China has encountered pitfalls and has had to backtrack. For 
example, economic retrenchment after Tiananmen in 1989 was reversed in 1991 
after a severe depression in economic growth. In a report designed to demonstrate 
renewed commitment to market reforms, General Secretary Jiang Zemin "strongly 
reaffirmed the importance of private and collective enterprises." Jiang "emphasized 
the urban . . . sector as an area of future growth that could absorb workers dis-
placed by reforms in the State sector." Miller, supra note 22, at 28. 
79. Salvatore Zecchini, Critical Issues in Privatisation, in METHODS OF 
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theory, the transformation in ownership itself provides the 
necessary incentives required to induce recently privatized 
organizations to respond in new ways. 
The transfer of State ownership is essential to create compe-
tition among enterprises in the market place, to promote 
entrepreneurship and risk taking in economic initiatives, to 
spur innovation in production and management and to favour 
the development of a new managerial class that is fully com-
mitted to achieving cost efficiency in combining different 
factors of production.80 
Although this strategy needs to be supplemented with 
other strategies such as fostering "the emergence of market 
participants and entrepreneurs that . . . are neither fully nor 
mainly under the direct control of the State-owner, [t]he trans-
fer of public-owned firms into private hands is the main ave-
nue to obtain this result in a short period."81 
Thus, according to the East European model of privatiza-
tion, state sector privatization sets a market economy in mo-
tion and makes it function. The question, of course, is how a 
market can possibly function if it has not yet been established. 
Nonetheless, proponents of state sector privatization are con-
vinced that the removal of the state from its management and 
ownership roles in the economy will put the workings of a well-
functioning market into action. 
It is the typical chicken and egg problem. Can a simple 
transfer of ownership from the state to the private sector cre-
ate the institutional environment necessary for a successful 
transition?82 Or is a market-conducive environment consisting 
of private businesses, reformed state enterprises and a legal 
infrastructure equipped with banking laws, commercial and 
civil codes, stock market regulation, modern accounting and 
PRIVATISING LARGE ENTERPRISES, supra note 59, at 72. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Of course, even its most ardent advocates do not believe that privatization 
alone will cure all ills. However, privatization is still viewed as the centerpiece of 
the reform process. See, e.g., MANN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1. "Privatization of 
large-scale, state-owned enterprises depends on and is part of a complex effort to 
achieve the private market economy." Id. at 4. In this regard, it is believed that 
the transfer of "ownership, control, and monitoring of firms will affect their con-
duct, and therefore the economic outcome of reforms." Id. at 3. 
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auditing system, and other regulatory agencies a prerequisite 
to state sector privatization? 
Ideologically as well as economically, China has been skep-
tical that privatizing the state sector could impart any mean-
ingful benefits when implemented in the absence of an estab-
lished market framework. Privatization will not spawn the 
benefits of competition or efficiency unless market forces have 
taken root. The Chinese model assumes that without the right 
market conditions, the newly privatized entity has no reason to 
act competitively if the new environment in which it finds 
itself is devoid of other competitive firms. Additionally, the 
privatized firm has no incentive to respond to consumer de-
mands if the scarcity of consumer goods means that any and 
all goods produced by the firm will be consumed.83 Sharehold-
er control over management may not even be feasible if the 
ownership structure is too diffuse, either because domestic 
shareholders have insufficient capital to purchase large blocks 
of shares or because foreign investors are unwilling or unable 
to own a controlling share. 
The central question for transitional economies is: what 
should be put in place first, private enterprises or competitive 
capital markets? For China, it is competitive capital markets. 
III. THE CREATION OF THE CHINESE NON-STATE SECTOR 
China was successful in establishing a sector of nonstate 
firms responsible for its record growth rate by adopting the 
right combination of initial conditions: a comprehensive legal 
infrastructure, rural decollectivization in favor of smaller-based 
household farming resulting in significant increases in produc-
tivity, income, and surplus capital. The increase in household 
savings combined with the shift towards light consumer indus-
tries have led to the establishment and proliferation of new 
economic organizations called the township village enterprises 
(TVE) further responsible for China's strong economic condi-
tion. 
This section examines China's step-by-step transformation 
83. Poland faced a different problem. Trade liberalization at the very early 
stages of reform led to a surge of imports into Poland which made it difficult if 
not impossible for domestic goods to compete. See Vedat Milor, Changing Political 
Economies: An Introduction, in CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMIES: PRIVATIZATION IN 
POST-COMMUNIST AND REFORMING COJ\IMUNIST STATES, supra note 43, at 14. 
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process and explores how each one contributed to future gains. 
It also examines the emergence of the nonstate sector and 
focuses on the TVE, one of the most productive economic enti-
ties in this newly emerging sector. Finally, it studies the non-
traditional corporate organization of TVEs and explores the 
implications TVE productivity pose for conventional under-
standings of economic growth and property arrangements, 
especially in the context of transitional economies. 
A. l,nducing Growth through Decollectivization, Household 
Farming and Nonstate Entities 
Since 1978 when China first instituted its open door poli-
cy, it has implemented the legal infrastructure of a market 
, economy. Examples include commercial and contract law, anti-
trust and labor law, environmental regulations, legislation 
regarding foreign-invested enterprises such as joint ventures 
and wholly foreign-owned companies, and regulations regard-
ing the acquisition and transfer of foreign exchange by 
nonstate actors.84 Aside from establishing the requisite legal 
infrastructure, it has also adopted courses of action which 
together create the environment necessary to foster the emer-
gence of a new, nonstate economic sector. 
How did China create this nonstate sector? As one econo-
mist has remarked, "factors of production need[ed] to be re-
leased to the new private sector."85 For example, new entre-
preneurs must have capital, labor, and land at their disposal. 
By first focusing on rural growth and reform86 and "generat-
ing huge increases in productivity, income, and output, with 
negligible state investment,"87 China laid the groundwork for 
84. For an overview of the legislative framework, see David Wall & Kiichiro 
Fukasaku, China's Open Economy Reforms 1978-1992, in FROM REFORM TO 
GROWTH: CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION IN AsiA AND CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 11, at 141, 152-55. 
85. Christopher Clague, Introduction: The Journey to a Market Economy, in 
THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 36, at 1, 
11. 
Land and building space should be made available; labor needs to move 
out of the public sector, and loans should be provided. Since it is unlike-
ly that private banks would provide sufficient capital for the new private 
sector if it is eA"}>anding at an appropriate speed, state banks will proba-
bly need to channel capital to new private enterprises. 
86. By doubling the incomes of China's farmers, rural reforms had the imme-
diate result of benefiting 800 million people. OVERHOLT, supra note 26, at 37. 
87. Overholt, supra note 31, at 30. Agrarian land reform was begun in 1978 
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an institutional structure which, in turn, generated sufficient 
surplus capital to be reinvested in even more profitable enter-
prises. 
In one of the more significant moves, China dissolved 
farming communes in favor of household-based agriculture. 
Commune-based agricultural lands were distributed en masse 
to individual households which were granted a wide degree of 
autonomy in production and marketing decisions so long as 
certain production quotas were met. 88 Because nonagricultur-
al assets formerly owned by the communes were sold at very 
inexpensive prices, newly emerging businesses were also pro-
vided with an inexpensive source of assets with which to start 
up production.89 
The state fostered initiatives and incentives by the institu-
tion of a "contract responsibility system,"90 whereby farmers 
organized by household units91 are allowed to contract with 
and resulted in China becoming "self-sufficient in food within two years." Diane 
Francis, Election the Only Solution for Russia: Interview with Mikhail Gorbachev, 
FIN. POST, Mar. 27, 1993 (weekly ed.), §5, at S3, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, ASIAPII File. 
As a point of contrast, as of 1993, only three percent of Russian farms had 
been privatized. Id. 
88. Keun Lee, Making Another East Asian Success in China, in FROM REFORM 
TO GROWTH: CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION IN ASIA AND CENTRAL 
AND EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 11, at 183, 190. 
89. Id. 
90. Robert Wessel, Reestablishing Private Business in Previously Socialist 
Economies, Bus. ECON., Jan. 1992, at 30, 32; see also A Survey of Perestroika, 
ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 1990, at 59, 21 (describing the responsibility contract as a 
system in which assets of the state are divided into household or "family plots" 
designed to grant farmers a "leasehold" on the land). For a general definition, see 
Article 27 of the General Principles of Civil Law, adopted by the Fourth Session 
of the Sixth National People's Congress on April 12, 1986, effective as of January 
1, 1987 ("[TJhe members of rural collective economic organizations who engage in 
commodity businesses within the scopes permitted by law and in accordance with 
the provisions of responsibility contracts are rural management undertaking house-
holds"). 
A household enterprise is the smallest licensed unit for running a business 
in China. 
The responsibility contract system is not limited to rural areas but is popu-
larly utilized in urban enterprises as well. The underlying principle remains the 
same: managers and workers of state enterprises enter into contractual relation-
ships with the state whereby performance goals are set. Anything above the stipu-
lated goal can be retained by the enterprise as distribution to the employees. 
91. Andrew X. Qian, Riding Two Horses: Corporatizing Enterprises and the 
Emerging Securities Regulatory Regime in China, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 62, 74 
(1993). 
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the state to sell a set quantity of produce at an officially set 
price. Any surplus generated by the household units can be 
freely sold on the market at the market price.92 Within ten 
years after rural reform was initiated, gross farm output in-
creased by a startling 138%.93 
The spectacular increase in output so significantly boosted 
the farmers' cash reserves that most were able to finance new 
projects themselves without having to resort to state loans. "In 
effect, very hard budget constraints were imposed on farmers 
(i.e., little credit was made available by the state banking 
system) as they entered the market economy. Further, the 
newly independent farmers viewed themselves as being under-
capitalized for financing on-farm investments, and they began 
building up their cash reserves."94 
In fact, it is uncontested that China's household saving 
rate is "unusually high even by East Asian standards."95 
Household savings in China is approximately 23% of dispos-
able income as compared to 21% in Japan, 18% in Taiwan, 
16% in Belgium, 13% in West Germany, and eight percent in 
the United States.96 A significant proportion of these savings 
is deposited into the state banking and rural credit cooperative 
system to be extended either as loans to nonstate firms or 
subsidies to state firms. 97 
92. Wessel, supra note 90, at 33-34. 
93. Id. at 34. 
"This principle has been applied, in a more limited fashion, even in large 
state enterprises. Various redrawn profit contracting schemes, and the eventual 
replacement of profit remission by tax payments, has led to the increased reten-
tion of profit by firms rather than government." Andrew G. Walder, Corporate 
Organization and Local Government Property Rights in China, in CHANGING POLIT-
ICAL ECONOI\fiES: PRIVATIZATION IN POST-COMMUNIST AND REFORMING COMMUNIST 
STATES, supra note 43, at 53, 58. 
China's growth rate expanded at an annual average of 8.3% in real net 
material product from 1978 to 1984, the first six years of reform. In contrast, the 
Soviet economy recorded a bare 2.7% growth rate from 1986 to 1989, the first five 
years of its reform. Lee, supra note 88, at 185. 
94. Pradumna B. Rana & Wilhelmina Paz, Economies in Transition: The Asian 
Experience, in FROM REFORM TO GROWTH: CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN TRAN-
SITION IN AsiA AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 11, at 119, 127, 
130. 
95. Sachs & Woo, supra note 11, at 28. 
96. Id. Before reforms were instituted in 1978, however, the average house-
hold saving rate in China was only two percent of household income. Naughton, 
supra note 74, at 58. 
97. Sachs & Woo, supra note 11, at 30 ("Loans are continuing to be injected 
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The combination of each of the five intricately intertwined 
factors described above (the dissolution of communes, the es-
tablishment of household-based family farming, the distribu-
tion of communal assets to family units, the "contract responsi-
bility system," and the increased household saving rate) creat-
ed the foundation for the emergence and proliferation of 
nonstate enterprises in rural and urban areas of China. Thus, 
while the dominance of state owned enterprises decreased, the 
number of nonstate enterprises, most notably the TVEs en-
gaged in both rural and industrial-based production increased. 
In fact, because "initial success [es] with the agricultural 
reform brought in more than 800 million peasant families as a 
strong support group for the reform,"98 China took advantage 
of this growth momentum and, in 1984, declared that similar 
reforms would be extended to the urban areas. Indeed, it was 
the "accumulation of wealth by rural families in China [which] 
led to the emergence of nonfarm industrial production and 
corresponding markets in rural and suburban towns and town-
ships."99 Because the Chinese economy, like other centrally 
planned economies, had historically devoted a 
disproportionately large portion of total resources to the state 
coffers and military industrial complexes while neglecting the 
production of consumer goods, it took but a modest amount of 
resources to provide the needed corrective. Thus, when the 
central government relaxed its monopolistic grip over industry 
as early as 1979, many of the start-up firms rushing to fill the 
void left by deregulation were rural industries organized along 
market-based ownership lines. Ownership types included: col-
lective, private, or foreign ownership, and even some officially 
listed as state owned because they had been sponsored by local 
governments.100 
to enterprises which are obviously at the edge of bankruptcy. Some loans have 
-been used to pay wages, which have a pretty name: 'loans to keep social stabili-
ty.m). 
98. Lee, supra note 88, at 185. 
99. Id. at 190. 
The phenomenal surge in surplus income derived from the dissolution of 
communes and the establishment of household farming has provided one source of 
capital used to create start-up businesses. Other sources include capital provided 
by the Chinese diaspora, especially those from Hong Kong and Taiwan, whose 
swift response as a source of foreign investment has resulted in the rapid develop-
ment of coastal provinces such as Guangdong and Fujian. Wall & Fukasaku, supra 
note 84, at 156-57. 
100. Naughton, supra note 74, at 58. 
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Given such heavy distortions, even a modest shift in re-
source allocation from government to consumer goods manufac-
turing could effectively jump-start the nonstate economy, since 
early entrants into this emerging and unexplored terrain were 
able to earn rapid and hefty profits.101 Thus, the very distor-
tions that had plagued so many planned economies acted as 
inducements to entrepreneurial and household businesses 
eager to fill unexploited niches.102 In China, the rise of a ru-
ral economy in conjunction with the shift from heavy industrial 
investment to light consumer goods production has created a 
strong nonstate sector with a maximum of economic productivi-
ty and a minimum of transition costs.103 
A further breakdown will reveal even more distinctions among economic 
entities within the nonstate sector: "foreign ventures, individual peasant farms, 
individual businesses, private enterprises, small-scale rural and urban co-opera-
tives, and medium-sized rural and urban collective enterprises." Lee, supra note 
88, at 202. 
101. Naughton, supra note 74, at 50. 
102. China, of course, is not alone in this regard. For example, the Polish pri-
vate sector grew from "15,000 in 1989 to more than 61,000 by March 1993" even 
though the government made little attempt to foster its growth. Gordon, supra 
note 43, at 552. 
103. Is the Chinese model of maximum nonstate sector growth and minimum 
state sector disruption applicable to other transitional economies? Certain initial 
conditions in China's economic structure might have facilitated the implementation 
of the two-track model: a relatively small state sector, a relatively small central 
plan, and a relatively large agricultural sector with a surplus pool of peasant 
workers combined to create optimal conditions for structural change. The state 
could afford to ignore the state sector and simply draw on surplus rural workers 
to create a new private sector. Sachs & Woo, supra note 11, at 23. Laos, 
Myanmar and Vietnam appear to be following the Chinese approach. 
It has also been suggested that China has been additionally blessed by the 
"advantage of backwardness," that is, that its lower level of income and skills 
have helped its quest to enter world markets. By contrast, in order to penetrate 
the international economic system, more economically advanced countries with a 
close to full employment economy, such as the Eastern European countries, would 
have to compete in the more competitive and technologically advanced sectors, 
making the task of restructuring more difficult. How significant are these differ-
ences? Would different structural conditions in Russia, for example, mean that the 
Chinese model is utterly inapplicable to the Russian experience? As one economist 
has noted, while China had to transfer unskilled rural workers from the agricul-
tural sector to the new manufacturing based private sector, Russia would have 
had to transfer state sector skilled urban workers to alternative nonstate sector 
urban jobs, if it had pursued the Chinese model of private sector creation. See 
Naughton, supra note 74, at 67-68. According to Naughton, a comparison of the 
Chinese and the Russian and Eastern European experiences reveals that the latter 
would have been faced with a less difficult task than China faced had they pur-
sued the Chinese model. 
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Among the newly emerging firms within this robust 
nonstate sector, the TVEs have exhibited remarkable growth 
and output rates. With the growth of TVEs, production of con-
sumer goods for both the export and domestic market devel-
oped, 104 and indeed prospered at an unprecedented rate.105 
Between 1981 and 1990, TVE output grew at an average rate 
of 29% per year while exports grew at an astounding average 
rate of 66% per year.106 Exports by rural industrial enterpris-
es include light manufactured goods, such as textiles (which 
account for one-fifth, or $6.5 billion of total exports in 1988), 
chemicals, and even machinery.107 The TVE sector is now the 
second largest in China's national economy, producing approxi-
mately 33% of all coal, 40% of all canned foods and 50% of 
electric fans in China. 108 Thus, TVEs have contributed to eco-
nomic growth in China as well as to the increasing market 
orientation of the nonstate sector. 
B. Collective Enterprises: Township and Village Enterprises 
As discussed above, TVEs came into being through a com-
bination of factors: the success of agricultural reforms, the 
[The] ECEs [Eastern and Central European economies] do not need to 
continuously generate millions of new jobs; they simply need to create 
enough new jobs to absorb the workers shed by inefficient producers. In 
that sense, a moderate growth of new firms should be able to gradually 
draw workers away from inefficient state firms, and produce a transition 
without massive amounts of socially destabilising unemployment. The 
ECEs have the same unexploited niches that China has, but fewer re-
serves of grossly underutilised labour in the countryside. Thus, a strategy 
of opening niches to new entrants should aid the restructuring process 
more rapidly than in China. 
Id. at 68. 
Thus, despite initial differences in structural conditions (China's labor sur-
plus, large rural sector, unskilled peasants and lesser developed economy versus 
Russia's relatively full employment, small rural sector, large urban industry, 
skilled workers and more developed economy), a strategy of private sector develop-
ment, for reasons discussed in this Article, could have been a viable alternative to 
immediate state sector privatization and its concomitant social and economic dislo-
cation. 
104. Cairncross & Lin, supra note 26, at 13. 
105. For an account of the home-grown private sector and the growth of small 
TVEs, see Hong Kong's Economy Safe in China's Hands, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 
Jan. 12, 1993, at 14, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File. 
106. WEITZMAN & Xu, supra note 46, at 9. 
107. Lee, supra note 88, at 190. 
108. WEITZMAN & XU, supra note 46, at 9. 
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availability of surplus rural labor, savings from increased agri-
cultural income, and increased consumer goods consumption 
due to the rise in income.109 Although TVEs are not privately 
owned enterprises in the traditional sense, 110 they do operate 
outside the orbit of the state sector and are very different from 
state sector firms. TVEs are "collectively owned"m but are 
not subsidized by the state and have hard budget constraints. 
They operate in a market environment by buying and selling 
on the market completely outside of the state plan, and they 
exercise much greater autonomy than state firms over their 
production decisions.112 
Despite their market orientation, TVEs are not purely 
private firms and are behaviorally as well as organizationally 
distinct from both state and private sector enterprises. TVEs 
are collectives often intricately intertwined with local govern-
ments. In this respect, TVEs exhibit behavior which reflect 
their hybrid and nontraditional origins. First, even though 
they are socially-based, they "must maintain financial respon-
sibility due to the limited financial means of local govern-
ments."113 
While township and village officials control TVE proper-
ty rights, their incentives are not identical to those of private 
owners. Township and village officials must take into account 
the interests of the local community to some extent, if they 
are to be effective in achieving a spectrum of economic and 
social indicators.114 
109. F. Gerard Adams, Economic Transition in China: What Makes China Dif-
ferent, in FROM REFORM: TO GROWTH: CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION 
IN AsiA AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 11, at 215, 224. 
110. TVEs are collectives and their members do not have a right of indivisible 
ownership nor the right of exclusivity over the collective. 
111. All members of the community are nominal owners and the community 
government is the de facto owner. WEITZMAN & Xu, supra note 46, at 11. 
112. WEI & LIAN, supra note 48, at 13. 
In contrast, collectives in the rural areas of the former Soviet Union were 
as tightly controlled as state farms with no apparent practical differences. Lee, 
supra note 88, at 203. 
113. Adams, supra note 109, at 224. 
114. Barry Naughton, Chinese Institutional Innovation and Privatization from 
Below, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 266, 268 (1994). Regard for community and social con-
siderations, however, do not mean that TVEs are immune from either bankruptcy 
or budget constraints or that TVEs are iron bowls and guarantee workers perma-
nent employment. 
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TVEs are neither private nor state enterprises and cannot 
easily fit into the traditional and binary classification of state 
planning or free market. 
TVEs, in fact, appear to be decentralized local states act-
ing in an entrepreneurial capacity. When the central govern-
ment eased barriers to entry into the light manufacturing 
sector, various economic actors, including local governments, 
stepped in to fill the economic void.115 These local govern-
ments vary in size and orientation but exhibit a common knack 
for detecting new market opportunities and mobilizing resourc-
es to promote selected industries within their jurisdictional 
zones. Some are large enough to encompass the entire popula-
tion of certain European countries, 116 most are subjected to 
hard budget constraints and possess "limited access to 
concessionary credits."117 Thus, many "act more like diversi-
fied corporations, competing with other locales, than like sov-
ereign entities."118 Yet, despite their market orientation, 
TVEs' collective ownership base also drives them "to take into 
account community members' preferences in their decision 
making .... [D]ecisions on the establishment of new TVEs 
[are] often discussed and made collectively at village meet-
ings."119 
The fact that such vaguely defined cooperatives have been 
a driving force behind the country's economic growth has been 
described as a paradox: an institution with a "vaguely defined 
ownership and reward structure,"120 which has outperformed 
the Eastern European model with its well defined bundles of 
private property arrangements. 
It has been summarily assumed that a full gambit of un-
ambiguous private property rights are essential for a market 
economy.121 Under this view, there must be a clear and exclu-
sive owner with the right to residual income which accrues in 
the property, as well as the right to transform, lease or sell it. 
Such private property rights are thought to be required be-
115. Naughton, supra note 74, at 53. 
· 116. Id. at 65. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. WEITZMAN & Xu, supra note 46, at 16-17. 
120. Id. at 3. 
121. See, e.g., id. at 5-6. 
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cause they provide owners with incentives to act as true own-
ers, to increase productivity and efficiency within the necessary 
confines of hard budget constraints.122 
TVEs simply do not fit within the established rules which 
a traditional property rights regime is supposed to entail. Be-
cause TVEs are collectives, the local community government, 
not a private owner, exercises ownership rights. Yet, such 
ownership rights are remarkable for what they omit rather 
than what they include. They do not include the right to sell or 
bequeath the TVE or its assets.123 Moreover, collective mem-
bers, who are nominal owners, do not decide when or how 
much benefits should be distributed, nor how to use such bene-
fits once they are distributed.124 For example, approximately 
60% of the after-tax profits of TVEs must be reinvested in a 
reserve fund, a welfare fund, and a bonus fund and cannot be 
distributed. In addition, even though collective members are 
"owners," nominal ownership rights do not bestow on them the 
automatic right to work in a TVE.125 Similarly, even though 
the local state is the "representative of all the 'owners,"'126 its 
ownership rights do not give it the right to fire TVE workers 
unless certain formal requirements are met. 
Yet, despite the lack of private ownership rights and the 
lack of full transfer, sale, or even use rights, TVEs have an 
uncontested record of economic growth. In an effort to make 
sense of this seemingly perplexing phenomenon, some econo-
mists have sought to impose a bright line conception of prop-
erty ownership on the TVEs by characterizing them as "pri-
vately-owned firms in disguise."127 These private firms are 
said to register as collective enterprises in order to receive 
benefits accorded to collectives. However, regardless of how 
these firms are formally registered, they are undeniably ·in a 
separate category from state and private enterprises as they 
122. Id. at 6. 
123. Id. at 12-13. The individual "owners" lose their ownership rights if they 
leave the community. 
124. Id. at 11. 
125. Id. at 13. 
126. Id. 
127. WEI & LIAN, supra note 48, at 14 ("'[P)rivate enterprises often registered 
as collectively owned [i.e., TVEs), with full concurrence of local officials, allowing 
the enterprises to gain access to bank credit and more favorable tax treatment.'") 
(quoting source provided by the Asian Development Bank, 1993). 
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exhibit a combination of market and collective-oriented behav-
iors. 
Thus, the fact that China's transition from central owner-
ship to market-oriented behavior has been driven by a collec-
tive base with socially-founded property rights which are not 
clearly defined should bring several privatization assumptions 
into question. According to conventional Western prescriptions, 
all entities with seemingly unclear property rights or multiple 
owners with overlapping interests are considered economically 
hazardous. Hence, the common Western indictment against 
Eastern European collectives or workers' cooperatives may not 
be universally accurate.128 With such single-minded focus on 
clear private property rights, it is no wonder that privatization 
of state assets has been mandated. 
First, the success of the TVEs reveals that wholesale reas-
signment of state property to private owners in order to clarify 
property rights may be neither a cure-all nor a prerequisite for 
all economies. Additionally, even in the West, it would be hard 
to find so much lopsided faith invested in such reassignment 
from public to private ownership alone. After all, even if great-
er productivity and efficiency is the economic raison d'etre of 
private ownership, it is not merely tied to ownership, but also 
to the perennial principal/agent problem of management and 
regulation. Private property without market forces may simply 
create private owners who perpetuate the patterns of ineffi-
cient and monopolistic behavior of their state predecessors. 
Second, it is ironic that unrestricted and unambiguous 
ownership rights are prescribed as imperatives for transitional 
economies when such rights do not always exist in Western 
economies themselves. Despite the indictment against 'jumbled 
and unclear" property rights and the deification of "unambigu-
ous individual rights needed for a successful market econo-
my,"129 even Western property regimes do not guarantee pri-
vate owners the unfettered right to use, destroy, develop, 
transform, sell, or lease the property in question. 
128. For a discussion of the necessity of worker ownership and control of for-
mer SOEs in Poland and the attendant conflicts which accompany it, see Robert 
Wisner, A Socialist Shortcut to Capitalism? The Role of Worker Ownership in East-
ern Europe's Mass Privatizations, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 123, 138-46 
(1993). 
129. Christopher Clague, supra note 85, at ix. 
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Nonetheless, the organizational structure of the TVEs 
reveals a set of property arrangements which appear to be 
much more perplexing than the typical Westem property ar-
rangement. For example, the social base (land and productive 
assets) which forms the foundation of the TVE, does not belong 
to any one individual, but to the collective and cannot be sold. 
If a TVE has been contracted to outside management, "all the 
assets (including the incremental part contributed by the con-
tractor) are still owned by all the labor mass collectively."130 
Third, the institution of private ownership rights, whether 
clearly or poorly defined, is not always a ·necessary require-
ment to a well-functioning market. TVEs are collective enter-
prises under the ownership and nominal control of govern-
ments at the local township, provincial, and village level. Since 
reform began in 1978, deregulation by the central government 
has presented the local state with new opportunities to re-
spond in classically entrepreneurial ways. Thus, like entrepre-
neurs, local governments have invested resources in TVEs 
poised to take advantage of new market niches. Local govern-
ments have also taken steps to facilitate the entry of new en-
terprises by: (1) allocating credit; (2) providing incentives; and 
(3) harnessing the pattern and direction of economic growth, 
while at the same time ensuring a minimum of state interfer-
ence in the management of such enterprises.131 Therefore, the 
local state retains an active role, with village and township 
officials "review!ng all important plans and decisions regarding 
expansion, investment, and product lines and playing very 
active roles in marketing. In many respects, local officials in 
rural areas have become entrepreneurs analogous to company 
executives."132 
In this regard, the TVE experience has an additional im-
plication; a well-functioning market, efficient allocation of 
resources, and economic productivity may very well coexist 
with conditions inconsistent with the very logic of privatiza-
130. WEITZMAN & XU, supra note 46, at 11. 
131. "[M)anagement is almost entirely independent of government." Cairncross 
& Lin, supra note 26, at 13. Thus, despite the fact that TVEs are "half-private, 
half-local government in ownership . . . their most important characteristic has 
little to do with ownership. They are established by entrepreneurial initiative, not 
by plan, and they have no assured support if they do not meet the test of the 
marketplace." OVERHOLT, supra note 26, at 67. 
132. Walder, supra note 93, at 62. 
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tion-the absence of private owners but the presence of very 
active local states which show no signs of withdrawing. Addi-
tionally, such local states are embodiments of organizational 
entities with wholly contradictory tendencies and mixed owner-
ship structures which are neither behaviorally nor structurally 
capitalist in the strictest sense of the word. Thus, effective, 
market-oriented reform is distinguishable from privatization as 
currently implemented by the former Soviet bloc. 
Fourth, wholesale state sector privatization may not be the 
only way to remedy the problem of soft budget constraints.133 
By downwardly reassigning use rights and income flows, from 
government administration to collectives and then to house-
holds, China, through the contract responsibility system, was 
able to alter the incentive structure without widespread and 
rapid state sector privatization, decreasing the need for the 
state to intervene with subsidies to keep an enterprise afloat. 
In addition, even though collectively held assets are retained 
by the collective, households are given the right to make man-
agement and marketing decisions regarding the assets in ex-
change for payments to the owners. As one commentator has 
described the shift, 
[i]n all of these downward transfers of use rights, the rela-
tionship between the principals (owners) and agents (their 
subordinates) has been altered from one of hierarchical au-
thority, in which the principal. specifies in detail the duties 
and methods of work of the agent, to one of contract, in 
which the agent gains increased autonomy in carrying out 
the assigned task in return for a contractually specified pay-
ment to the owners.134 
Economic growth in China has been generated primarily 
by the newly emerging nonstate sector and its economic enti-
ties. Despite their nominally complementary status, 135 enter-
133. Originally coined by the Hungarian economist Janos Komai, an enterprise 
experiences soft budget constraints when no connection exists between its earnings 
and its expenditures. Thus, even if expenditures chronically exceed earnings and 
cause deficits, such deficits are resolved not by internal adjustments but by out-
side intervention. In centrally planned economies, the state usually steps in and 
provides the needed subsidies, either with capital from the central bank or from 
other money-making state enterprises, creating the additional problem of a never· 
ending chain of interfirm debt. Milor, supra note 83, at 20 n.17. 
134. Walder, supra note 93, at 57-58. 
135. For example, the Constitution was revised in 1988 to reaffirm the state's 
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prises outside the state sector have proliferated to such an 
extent that they have overtaken firms inside the state sector. 
According to the Asian Development Bank's 1994 Asian Devel-
opment Report, state firms, which still produce half of China's 
total industrial output, grew by a mere 6.4%. In contrast, the 
outputs of TVEs grew by over 40%, and private enterprises 
and foreign joint-venture enterprises grew by more than 
45%.136 
While this separate sector of new firms has provided the 
engine for growth and contributed to the emergence of a more 
market-oriented culture and environment, 137 the state sector 
has not necessarily benefitted from the surge of nonstate 
growth. The state sector has remained essentially unaltered, 
not just as the canonical foundation of "socialism with Chinese 
characteristics," but as a statistical albatross on the Chinese 
state. Indeed, after years of reform, the state sector still con-
sists of over 100,000 state enterprises which employ 75% of 
China's urban labor force of approximately 108 million work-
ers. Additionally, in September 1994, 44.5% of state owned 
enterprises were losing money, with total losses climbing to 
commitment to a system of public ownership supplemented by an ancillary sector 
consisting of individual and private economies. "The state permits the private 
sector of the economy to exist and develop within the limits prescribed by law. 
The private sector of the economy is a complement to the socialist public econo-
my." ZHONGHUA RENMIN GoNGHEGUO XIANFA [Constitution] [XIANFA (1982)] art. 11. 
Under China's system of classification, there are two categories of private 
businesses. First, there are private individual businesses, which are driven by 
single-household labor and hire less than eight employees. Second, there are pri-
vate businesses which hire more than eight employees. This group is also called 
"private capitalistic businesses" and is considered exploitative in nature. See Lee, 
supra note 88, at 191. 
136. Isberto, supra note 48. 
A sample of 434 Chinese cities showed significant differences between the 
performances of state and nonstate firms. Nonstate firms grew at a faster rate 
than state firms. Moreover, the shares in output· for state firms declined from 
78.1% in 1988 to 73.3% in 1990. Meanwhile, the shares in output for nonstate 
firms increased over the same period, with TVEs gaining an increase of five per-
centage points. See WEI & LIAN, supra note 48, at 15. 
137. China's strategy of creating an increasingly market-oriented environment 
also included the establishment of special economic zones (SEZs), economic labora-
tories, in other words, for the experimentation with trade and investment between 
Chinese and foreign investors. SEZs were more than export processing zones and 
were in fact intended to be "windows and bridges," windows through which the 
outside world could view the Chinese economy, and vice versa, and bridges over 
which Chinese and foreign enterprises could cross. Wall & Fukasaku, supra note 
84, at 157. 
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over 29 billion yuan. 138 
IV. REFORMING THE STATE SECTOR 
This part examines efforts taken towards the transforma-
tion of the state sector. The first" section explores various mea-
sures adopted by the government to expose state sector enter-
prises to market disciplines and to reorient state sector behav-
ior in the absence of state sector privatization. The second 
section studies the current phase of Chinese state sector pri-
vatization. It examines the recent securitization of Chinese 
state enterprises and assesses the ideological and regulatory 
framework adopted by the government to control and limit 
state sector privatization. 
A. Enterprise Reform without State Sector Privatization 
"It takes more than one cold day 
for a river to freeze three feet deep."139 
In general, it has been said that "the important distinction 
is not public versus private-it is monopoly versus competi-
138. Xiao Yu, Backing for State Firms, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 7, 1994, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File. 
In 1992, a full one-third of China's state enterprises were insolvent, another 
one-third suspected of heavy losses, and only one-third could be considered profit-
able. Gong, supra note 7, at 34. Also in 1992, $7.82 billion of China's 1992 state 
expenditures were used as subsidies to cover losses, an amount which did not 
include "soft loans" made with little expectations of repayment by state banks. Id. 
For an understanding of the sheer size and magnitude of China's economy 
and the complexity of reforming such a vast number of enterprises, see David 
Bachman, China and Privatization, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC SECTOR 
REFORM AND PRIVATIZATION 275 (Ezra Suleiman & John Waterbury eds., 1990). As 
of 1985, there were approximately 463,000 urban industrial enterprises, 94,000 
state-owned factories, 368,000 collective enterprises, 1,570,000 rural collective in-
dustrial enterprises, and more than 10,000,000 private rural enterprises. Also there 
were 25,000,000 commercial enterprises, of which 4,000,000 were state enterprises, 
9,000,000 were collective enterprises and 12,000,000 were individual enterprises. 
All have undergone some type of reform. In contrast, Hungarian economic reform 
involved only about 700 enterprises. Id. at 278. 
139. "Exclusive Extracts" from Wu Bangguo Speech at Economic Meeting, British 
Broadcasting Corp. Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan. 30, 1995, available in 
LEXIS, News Library, TBBCSW File [hereinafter Bangguo Speech). "The reform of 
state-owned enterprises is a long-term task. The goal in terms of timing raised by 
the central economic work conference is to properly solve the problems of state-
owned enterprises by the end of this century. The reason is quite obvious: 'It 
takes more than one cold day for a river to freeze three feet deep.'" Id. 
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tion."140 Under this theory, a simple transfer of ownership 
from public to private interests will not increase efficiency. 
Managerial responsibility and accountability to the public 
interest must be introduced through a complementary system 
of competition from other providers, and compensation and 
incentives based on performance measurements.141 Essential-
ly, at the core of Chinese reform is the eventual separation of 
state and private enterprise. That is, a separation of the 
government's economic management function from its role as 
the custodian of state assets.142 
It has been precisely within the parameters of this theoret-
ical umbrella that China first attempted to revamp its state 
sector. In 1991, the Party's reformist ideology re-emerged after 
Tiananmen and reasserted Deng Xiaoping's economic agenda, 
which places fundamental reforms of medium and large state 
enterprises at the forefront. 143 The changes approved by the 
Communist Party's 14th Congress included bold measures for 
managerial reform in accordance with the ''law of the fittest," 
management with neither state interference nor state 
assistance, 144 designed to force the state sector to "emulate 
the more dynamic collective and private sectors through com-
petition at home and in the international economy."145 
Most recently, the Chinese government has identified state 
owned enterprise reform as the major task of economic restruc-
140. John B. Goodman & Gary W. Loveman, Does Privatization Serve the Pub-
lic Interest?, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1991, 26, 28. In what the authors term 
an attempt to move the privatization debate from "the ideological ground of pri-
vate versus public to the more pragmatic ground of managerial behavior and ac-
countability," the focus becomes simply "good management-regardless of owner-
ship." Id. at 28. 
141. Id. 
142. Yu, supra note 138. 
143. Miller, supra note 22, at 24. The emergence of a nonstate sector means 
that "more than two-thirds of current economic activity takes place outside the 
State system." Id. at 28-29. However, "the remaining third," the inefficient state 
enterprises, still has to be reformed. This is a difficult task considering the size of 
some of the enterprises. For example, some steel or coal companies have more 
than 100,000 employees. OVERHOLT, supra note 26, at 62. 
144. Miller, supra note 22, at 29. 
145. Id. at 31. Other modes of reform include mergers. In the 1980s, almost 
7000 enterprises were merged and approximately 4000 enterprises came out of the 
red, reducing the level of losses by 522 million yuan. Speeding Up Reform with 
Regard to Property Rights, Xinhua General Overseas News Service, Mar. 14, 1994, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, XINHUA File. 
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turing in 1995. China's President, Jian Zemin identified the 
"three keys" required to successfully open up China's economy, 
each of which is dependent on and intimately connected to the 
success of state sector reform. Thus, 
the key to building socialism with Chinese characteristics lies 
in successfully running large and medium state owned enter-
prises; the key to accelerating the establishment of a socialist 
market economic system lies in making substantive progress 
in the reform of large and medium state owned enterprises; 
and the key to gaining a favourable position for fierce inter-
national economic competition in the 21st century lies in 
comprehensively enhancing the competitiveness of large and 
medium state owned enterprises.146 
The gradual shift towards market-oriented reform in other 
spheres of the economy has had a percolating effect on the 
behavior and performance of the state sector. No longer are 
state enterprises automatically immune from the effects of 
market forces. State enterprises must now cope with market 
competition rather than simply navigating the bureaucratic 
channels for their survival. No longer can they concentrate 
solely on satisfying the central plan's targets at the expense of 
the needs of their customers. TVEs and other nonstate enter-
prises ''have seeped into all the nooks and crannies of busi-
nesses formerly under the monopoly control of state enterpris-
es, like salt water infiltrating cement and gradually breaking 
it up."l47 
Thus, the environment in which state enterprises dwell is 
no longer completely centralized and monolithic. Competition 
from the outside has forced state enterprises to be competitive 
from within as well. Hence, a steady, though insufficient, in-
crease in· state sector productivity and competitiveness has 
occurred.148 
146. Bangguo Speech, supra note 139. 
147. OVERHOLT, supra note 26, at 67. 
148. Even China's largest tractor manufacturer, for example, had to experiment 
with new ways to increase its market share. It has tried "'to improve the quality 
of its products as well as its marketing and publicity techniques in a bid to off-
set . . . sluggish domestic sales . . . . The Luoyang tractor complex had been 
forced to sacrifice more than half of its profits in trying discounts, lotteries and 
free delivery of goods to boost sales.'" Thomas G. Rawski, Progress Without Pri-
vatization: The Reform of China's State Industries, in- CHANGING POLITICAL ECONO· 
MIES: PRIVATIZATION IN POST-COMMUNIST AND REFORMING COMMUNIST STATES 39 
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Aside ·from exposing state enterprises to increased compe-
tition from the nonstate sector, the government also added a 
second ingredient for reform: private initiatives and manageri-
al compensation based on performance instituted under a sys-
tem essentially similar to the agricultural responsibility con-
tract system. 149 Responsibility contracts have been utilized by 
parties at all levels of the production and distribution chain: 
"between the state and enterprises . . . between central and 
local authorities, between localities, between local authorities 
at various levels and between an enterprise and its staff and 
workers. "150 
Under the managerial responsibility system, managers are 
given greater autonomy and responsibility over the "microeco-
nomic" details of the enterprise. Thus, consistent with reforms 
begun during the late 1970s and early 1980s designed to in-
crease enterprise autonomy, managers are granted greater 
power to decide such things as what to produce, where to buy 
supplies, how to market the products, and how large the work 
force should be.151 Reforms initiated include profit sharing 
plans, bonus plans tied to managerial or enterprise perfor-
mance, and the legalization of price flexibility based on supply 
and demand. 
Enterprise and state can also enter into contracts stipulat-
ing the amount of tax and profit the enterprise is required to 
turn over to the state. 152 Once the performance goals of the 
enterprise have been met, the enterprise is allowed to retain 
excess profits which may be used however its management 
(Vedat Milor ed., 1994) (quoting Anming Gao, Giant Tractor Maker Plagued by 
Slow Sales, CHINA DAILY, May 28, 1991, at 4). 
149. The major laws on reform of state enterprise management include, among 
others, the following: Law of the People's Republic of China on Industrial Enter-
prises Owned by the Whole People, Apr. 13, 1988, China Laws for Foreign Busi-
ness, 2 Business Regulation (CCH) 'li 13-534 (1989); and, Provisional Regulations 
for State-Owned Industrial Enterprises, Apr. 1, 1983, China Laws for Foreign 
Business, 2 Business Regulation (CCH) 'li 13-500 (1989). 
150. Observe Economic Laws, Speed Up Four Modernizations, Xinhua General 
Overseas News Service, Oct. 16, 1978, auailable in LEXIS, News Library, XINHUA 
File. 
151. Bachman, supra note 138, at 279. 
152. Id. The system based on managerial incentives has also been called "man-
agement targets responsibility," in which enterprise managers and the state would 
enter into a contract enumerating certain targets to be met by managers within a 
specified period of time. Qian, supra note 91, at 73. 
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deems desirable. In addition, workers within the enterprise are 
granted an incentive bonus if they exceed the performance 
commitments contracted with management.153 Both enter-
prises and workers are granted a portion of the enterprises' 
income rights in the form of profit retention for enterprises 
and bonuses for workers. 
Therefore, even within the parameters of state ownership, 
China instituted property rights reform by assigning use rights 
downward from the central plan towards more enterprise au-
tonomy. The downward transfer of use rights (the right to use 
the enterprise and its assets) was also accompanied by the 
parallel transfer of the right to retain profits. 154 By adopting 
profit contracting arrangements and by shifting from requiring 
enterprises to remit profits to simply requiring them to pay 
taxes, state enterprises have been allowed to retain a larger 
proportion of their profits to be disposed of at the discretion of 
the enterprise managers.155 
Transfers of property rights have in turn led to other 
forms of unofficial assignments. An example of these assign-
ments is the system of informal subcontracting and leasing ar-
rangements which have, in effect, created a '"secondary 
market' in use and income rights over productive assets."156 
Such secondary markets have allowed state enterprises to 
lease the right to use land, offices, buildings, and vehicles to 
entrepreneurs, thereby maximizing their budgets through such 
informal arrangements.157 
In addition to separating ownership and management to 
153. Bersani, supra note 6, at 306; see also Hilary Joseph, Labor Reform in the 
Workers' State: The Chinese Experience, 2 J. CHINESE L. 201, 206 (1988). 
Other arrangements designed to boost production through a system of pri-
vate initiatives include arrangements allowing managers to bid for the right to 
manage certain enterprises. Potential managers enter a bidding process and the 
successful bidder contracts with the state to generate a set amount of profit over 
a fixed period of time. The manager awarded the "lease management rights" is 
allowed to retain all profits minus the amount previously committed. Bachman, 
supra note 138, at 279-80. For example, in the seaport town of Qingdao, 
reformists have disposed of near-bankrupt businesses by allowing local entrepre-
neurs to take over everything under the "state ownership, private management" 
arrangement. Pete Engardio, Capitalism Seeps Into an Old Port, Bus. WEEK (lnt'l 
Ed.), June 13, 1994, at 4. 
154. See Walder, supra note 93, at 58. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 59. 
157. Id. 
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increase enterprise efficiency and productivity/58 China also 
spearheaded an additional series of reforms designed to create 
a dual track pricing system consisting of dual prices within the 
state sector itself. Thus, there are two prices for each commodi-
ty, one price set by the state in accordance with its plan, and 
the other set by the market in accordance with the law of sup-
ply and demand. While state owned enterprises must still meet 
their compulsory quota within the plan and must still sell their 
products to the state at a typically lower, state-assigned price, 
any surplus generated above the state's quota becomes market 
products to be sold at market price. As more commodities are 
released from the auspices of the plan, more enterprises are 
seeking new ways to take advantage of these more profitable 
opportunities, thus eroding the centrality of the plan. Contrast 
this strategy of gradual price reform with the conventional 
Western prescription for "Big Bang'' price adjustment which 
requires an immediate shift from controlled prices to market 
prices. 
This two-tier pricing system for state sector goods accom-
plished two purposes. First, it introduced state sector enter-
prises to the basic concept of the market and, when combined 
with the system of managerial incentives described above, it 
encouraged them to adopt certain conceptual as well as con-
crete changes in behavior. For instance, it encourages these 
firms to operate at market prices and to think in terms of 
greater productivity and efficiency. Second, it allowed state 
sector enterprises to interact and transact with nonstate sector 
enterprises, and these transactions "developed into a remark-
able variety of forms."159 State sector and nonstate sector 
trade, whether in the form of various cooperative arrange-
ments or joint ventures, increased, as profit-minded state sec-
tor enterprises sought to economize by subcontracting with 
more efficient nonstate rural businesses.160 
158. In a command economy such as China's, the state owns and manages the 
enterprise. By contrast, an American corporation generally divorces management 
from ownership so that the owners (shareholders) are not the same as the manag-
ers who run the enterprise on a daily basis. China has sought to build a "Chinese 
wall" between ownership and management without losing ownership control. 
159. Naughton, supra note 74, at 53. 
160. Id. However, private sector firms should not be allowed to make excess 
profits by purchasing goods at below market price from state firms and selling 
them to the public at market price. The misuse of the dual price system by inter-
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By increasing the competitive pressures exerted on state 
enterprises and by implementing other measures designed to 
improve enterprise performance, the move towards enterprise 
reform has led to some positive results. For example, basic 
data on state and collective industry compiled from 1978 to 
1988 revealed that the gross output value of state owned enter-
prises increased from 342.1 billion yuan in 1978 to 1.35 trillion 
yuan in 1988.161 Other data also revealed sustained improve-
ments in at least several measures of productivity. For in-
stance, the total factor of productivity in state owned industry 
during the 1980s increased at an annual average of 2.4%, not 
as rapidly as the TVE sector, which improved at a rate of 4.6%, 
but an increase nonetheless. 162 
While the reforms described above have clearly created 
palpable changes in the environment in which state enterpris-
es operate and hence changes in the behavior of state enter-
prises, they appear to be inadequate mechanisms in and of 
themselves unless adopted in conjunction with some state 
sector privatization. Although it appears that state enterprises 
have experienced increased productivity, the generous profit 
retention schemes expended towards worker bonuses, worker 
housing construction projects, and other enterprise funds have 
resulted in a decrease in enterprise profits remitted to the 
state.163 The resulting increase in the accumulation of con-
sumption funds, which exerted inflationary pressure on the 
economy, 164 the concomitant reduction of state revenues, and 
the increase in state subsidies to inefficient enterprises have 
forced the state to find ways to raise money and at the same 
time curb inflation. The continued inability of the state sector 
to support itself.-20% of China's annual revenues had to be 
pumped into the more than 60% of the state owned enterprises 
that continued to lose money165-meant that the government 
mediaries and the popular resentment generated may have contributed to the 
Tiananmen Square demonstrations. Clague, supra note 85, at 8 n.2. 
161. Rawski, supra note 148, at 30. But see Lee, supra note 88, at 194 (in-
creases in profit retention schemes and managerial autonomy have not resulted in 
significant increases in economic efficiency and productivity). 
162. Walder, supra note 93, at 60. 
163. Lee, supra note 88, at 194. 
164. Id. 
165. Schell & Lappin, supra note 7, at 728. Some economists, however, have 
come to a different conclusion. While acknowledging 1989 data showing state sec-
tor losses, they nonetheless point to the fact that such mounting losses came pri-
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truly had no choice but to move the experiment from a simple 
contract system with limited marketization to a more ideologi-
cally complex shareholding system. That is, to a system of 
decentralized ownership and multiple shareholders. 
However, in keeping with past practices, extensive prepa-
ratory work had to be done along ideologically meticulous lines 
so that radical experimentation could be safely channelled into 
harmony and conformity with socialist theory. Thus, divesting 
the state of its ownership interest in state owned enterprises 
could not be called privatization in China. As Liu Hongru, Vice 
Minister of the State Commission for Restructuring the Eco-
nomic System, declared, "What we resolutely oppose is privat-
ization. But we do not because of that oppose a stockholding 
system."166 
B. Privatizing the State Sector 
"Are such things as securities and stock markets good or 
bad? ... Can they only exist under capitalism? Cannot they 
also be adapted to socialism?"167 
While there is a mandate for mass and rapid privatization 
of state sector enterprises in Eastern Europe, no such mandate 
exists in China. Thus, the securitization of state enterprises 
and the establishment of a securities market presented China 
with one of its most controversial ideological issues to date: the 
conversion of state enterprises into a joint stock or 
shareholding system and the subsequent ownership of equity 
in such enterprises by private participants. After years of try-
ing to revive the state sector through a series of half-hearted 
measures, China has finally begun to allow outside equity 
interest in state enterprises. However, as will be demonstrated 
marily from two sectors-coal mining and petroleum extraction-due primarily to 
artificially low prices administered by the state. See Rawski, supra note 148, at 
38. Additionally, other losses occurred in defense industries and were caused by 
declining demand resulting from the easing of tension between China and its 
neighbors. Thus, about two-thirds of 1989 losses could be traced back to causes 
which were unrelated to state sector inefficiency. Id. at 38-39. 
166. Qian, supra note 91, at 83. 
167. Speech made by Deng Xiaoping on his visit to one of China's most eco-
nomically thriving zones, Shenzhen Economic Zone in Guangdong Province, quoted 
in Schell & Lappin, supra note 7, at 729. 
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below, the ideological framework currently in place, designed 
to accommodate both market and socialism, reflects not just 
the quandaries of its two genetically mixed origins but also the 
hiccups of political deadlock and compromise. 
The following sections examine Chinese state sector pri-
vatization. In particular, focus will be placed on the motiva-
tions underlying the government's decision to securitize its 
state enterprises and on its marked preference for securitizing 
such enterprises through debt rather than equity. The recent 
creation of the securities exchanges and the ideological under-
currents which have shaped and defined the Chinese securities 
market will then be discussed. Particular emphasis will be 
paid to the government's preference for issuing debt instead of 
equity, the government's desire to engage in only limited state 
sector privatization, and the government's insistence on retain-
ing its paramount interests as majority shareholder. 
1. Motivations and Historical Developments 
There are two overriding motivations underlying China's 
move towards a securities system: the inability of traditional 
sources of financing to meet the capital requirements of insol-
vent state enterprises168 and the desire of the state to tap in-
to a pool of private capital outside direct state control. In this 
latter respect, the Chinese model of privatization has produced 
a distinctively Chinese reality-state sector privatization moti-
vated by the surplus, not the dearth of domestic capital. This 
fact makes the free distribution schemes adopted in Eastern 
Europe economically unnecessary. 
The Chinese government has shown remarkable dexterity 
in its capital fundraising endeavor. It has converted state busi-
nesses into shareholder enterprises and allowed shares of se-
lect enterprises to be traded on the stock exchange. In this 
way, the government was able to raise funds without direct 
foreign credits or direct foreign investment in either joint ven-
tures or wholly foreign-owned enterprises.169 By establishing 
168. There are four main sources of financing for state enterprises: (1) fiscal 
appropriations; (2) funds generated by the enterprises themselves, including profits 
and depreciation expenses; (3) bank loans; and (4) debt and equity issuances. Qian, 
supra note 91, at 66 n.ll. 
169. See Jia Zhao & Li Qian, Trading Stocks in China: Development, Regula· 
tion, Issues and Prospects, E. AsiAN EXECUTIVE REP., June 15, 1992, at 7, 8. "Be-
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a securities market, the government was able to create a 
unique opportunity to raise capital and, at the same time, 
draw into its sphere of control a wealth of private resources 
previously hidden outside the state's reach, namely a surplus 
of savings under almost one billion Chinese mattresses. 
The prosperity and proliferation of the nonstate sector has 
meant that China's citizens have been able to save large 
amounts of money.170 With one of the highest saving rates in 
the world (30%),171 private surplus capital amounted to an 
under-utilized pool of approximately 1.3 trillion yuan ($260 
billion).172 This pool of private capital was either hidden un-
der mattresses or tied up in low-yield bonds or low-interest 
savings accounts.173 The amount of private savings is even 
cause of the government's policy of encouraging foreign investors, enterprises that 
could not themselves get loans from banks for the purpose of expanding production 
capacity were given an opportunity to obtain financing if they entered into joint 
ventures with foreign investors. With the general shortage of financing, however, 
Chinese companies found that entering into a joint venture did not necessarily 
guarantee bank loans." Id. 
170. The problem confronting Eastern Europe and Russia is almost the reverse. 
While an enormous pool of private capital in China has been created both to the 
dismay and joy of the government, the opposite has occurred in the former East-
ern bloc. Because of a scarcity of domestic capital, privatization in Eastern Europe 
has indeed taken a markedly different route. For example, an outright purchase of 
shares by Polish citizens of privatized enterprises had to be ruled out because 
even "under the very optimistic assumption that people are prepared to spend 20-
30% of all their savings to buy shares in the privatized enterprises, the amount of 
money available for the purchase of the state companies would equal between 
2.4% and 3.6% of their book value." FRYDMAN & RAPACZ'YNSKI, supra note 14, at 
22. A distribution program of free vouchers, therefore, would "eliminate the prob-
lem of capital" as well as "legitimacy problems associated with selective give-
aways." Id. at 27. 
171. Schell & Lappin, supra note 7, at 730. Other sources have estimated an 
even higher savings rate of 39%. See, e.g., Money and Banking: 11.4 Securities and 
Bond Markets, CHINA HAND, Oct. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, 
CHINAH File. Despite its high savings rate, "[slaving remains an unattractive 
prospect because the bank interest rates are typically low (often lower than the 
rate of inflation)." Id.; see also China, EUROMONEY: HANDBOOK OF WORLD ECONO-
MIES AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES, Sept. 1992, at 121, 124 (Supp.). Analysts 
estimate that as much as $200 billion sits idle in the domestic banking system, 
while up to $100 billion is concealed outside the system by individuals distrustful 
of banks. Household savings in China provides approximately 70% of funds used 
to finance new investment. Guardiano, supra note 1. 
172. Others have estimated that the private savings in China have amounted 
to $310 billion. Business Briefing: China, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 1, 1993, at 83, 
available in Westlaw, Far Eastern Economic Review Database. 
173. Schell & Lappin, supra note 7, at 730. 
The financial system remains primitive but is slowly improving. Despite a 
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more astonishing when compared to the value of state held 
assets, which totalled approximately $240 billion.174 
With $41 billion worth of foreign debe75 and its state en-
terprises chronically running at a deficit, China's securities 
exchange system was undoubtedly motivated by the desire to 
utilize private capital to finance public debt.176 The availabil-
ity of domestic private capital allowed China to avoid Eastern 
Europe's problem of finding domestic buyers for state assets. 
By contrast, Russia and certain Eastern European countries 
such as Poland have had to resort to the free distribution of 
vouchers, 177 thus foregoing the possibility of raising funds for 
insolvent enterprises through the privatization process itself. 
China, on the other hand, had no difficulty locating domestic 
capital. In fact, the very existence of such a vast source of pri-
vate capital beyond the state's control may have been one of 
the primary motivations behind China's decision to institute 
state sector privatization. 
The development of a shareholding system and a stock 
exchange was also motivated by the concern that a surplus 
accumulation of savings would overheat the economy. In short, 
too much money could create high inflation if used to chase too 
few consumer goods.178 In this respect, China's attempt to di-
large disposable pool of savings, investment opportunities remain limited. These 
opportunities are, however, rapidly expanding. At the end of 1993, the combined 
value of all securities outstanding in China had a value of 750 billion yuan, of 
which 544 billion are debt securities. (The exchange rate, as of March 1, 1994, is 
$1 equals 8.7 yuan.). Yu Zhang, China's Emerging Securities Markets, 29 COLUM. 
J. WORLD BUS. 113 (1994). 
174. Business Briefing: China, supra note 172, at 83. 
175. Juliet Sychrava, China: Marches to a Changing Tune, EUROMONEY, Aug. 
13, 1990, at 47, 48. Another estimate puts the foreign debt at the highest avail-
able figure of $67 billion at the end of 1991. See OVERHOLT, supra note 26, at 56. 
176. As Jing Shuping, one of the first proponents of a shareholding system and 
a permanent director of the China International Trust and Investment Corporation 
has unabashedly explained, a shareholding system can do the following: "'First, it 
can turn some of the consumption fund into production fund and promote the 
development of production . . . . Second, it is a new way to absorb foreign capi-
tal .... Third, it helps enterprises to restrain themselves and makes them im-
prove efficiency and develop healthily.'" Qian, supra note 91, at 83. 
A share system also allows the government another way of raising money 
besides "forcing state factories to buy government treasury notes through compul-
sory wage deductions." Peter Goodspeed, 'Capitalist Oppression' Is Back as 
Shanghai Market Re-Opens, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 16, 1990, at F1, available in 
LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, TSTAR File. 
177. Gordon, supra note 43, at 522-23. 
178. Paul Schroeder, Rebuilding China's Securities Markets, CHINA Bus. REV., 
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vert surplus capital away from either idle savings or overheat-
ed inflationary spending has been quite successful.179 It has 
not only presented the government with a strategy for averting 
inflation, but has also given the government an opportunity for 
using domestic resources, rather than relying exclusively on 
foreign capital, to generate economic growth. 
Like its other market-oriented measures, China's conver-
sion of inert domestic savings into investment capital had to be 
accomplished within the specific parameters of market social-
ism. Just as the private sector could only supplement the more 
dominant public economy, so too must private capital be con-
tained. Thus, as more fully discussed below, any equity the 
state extracts from Chinese personal savings could only be 
channelled, at the early stages of the securitization experi-
ment, into debt instruments which do not implicate socialist 
ownership of the means of production; and currently, into lim-
ited minority interests in state enterprises.180 
As the Deputy Director of the State Commission for Re-
structuring the Economy, Liu Hongru, boldly announced, ''We 
May-June 1991, at 20, 21 ("A capital market could also assist further experiments 
in price reform by easing inflationruy pressures, as money would be steered to-
ward investment rather than consumer spending."). A shareholding system has 
been assigned a multitude of functions. Shares can be used to raise capital for fi-
nancing purposes by coaxing private savings into an arena susceptible to the con-
trol of the state. They can also be used to solve China's "two contradictory eco-
nomic imperatives. One is slowing an overheated economy. The other is seizing 
perceived historical opportunities for accelerated development." Gong, supra note 7, 
at 36. 
179. As the head of a consulting company remarked: "'The most important sign 
of China's economic development in the 1990's is that savings have started to 
come out into the market.'" Sheila Tefft, Shanghai: Boom Town of the East, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 31, 1993, at 6. 
180. Everywhere in China it seems, scholars and practitioners strain to reiter-
ate the idea of private equity shareholding within the context of public ownership. 
One scholar made the distinction that "changes in the forms of realization of pub-
lic ownership" will not undermine "the essence of public ownership," Qian, supra 
note 91, at 81 n.74, since a shareholding system is only a product of the socializa-
tion of the means of production and not an inherent product of capitalism: 
'The shareholding system has emerged under the capitalist system but it 
is not the exclusive right of capitalism. Rather, it is the product of the 
socialization and commercialization of production. It may exist under the 
capitalist system but it can also exist under the socialist system and 
serve socialism.' 
Qian, supra note 91, at 82 (quoting Xiao Zuoji, Shixin Shehui Zhuyi Gongyouzhi 
De Xinshi [On the Forms of Realizing Socialist Ownership], 2 JINGJI YANJIU 38 
(1992)). 
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are a socialist country, and we must hold fast to public owner-
ship of assets, and to the principle of combining a market econ-
omy and a planned economy. Under these conditions we will 
create securities markets."181 
2. The Initial Securitization of State Sector Firms: 
Equity Subdued 
The securitization of Chinese state enterprises occurred in 
two phases. The first phase was marked by a sharp preference 
for the issuance of debt over equity. The second phase was 
marked by the mandate for majority state interests in the 
privatized enterprises. 
Initially, China's experiments with securities were strictly 
limited to the issuance of internal bonds in the form of 
workers' bonus shares. Unlike the first phase of reform, where 
sound economic reasons existed for the strategy of retaining 
the state sector while creating a new nonstate sector, the path 
of state sector securitization currently pursued by the govern-
ment is much less the product of rational economic policy than 
political impasse. 
In an ideologically inoffensive move designed to make 
socialist "worker ownership" compatible with individual in-
centives and profits, enterprises were allowed to issue incen-
tive shares to their own employees.182 It was hoped that by 
tying employee compensation to economic performance through 
employee equity participation in the enterprise, employees 
would have greater incentives to make the enterprise more 
profitable. In the early 1980s, however, as enterprises became 
insolvent, incentive shares originally intended to boost worker 
morale transmogrified into compulsory bonds forced onto em-
ployees by money-losing enterprises as a substitute for mone-
tary compensation.183 Sometimes as much as 10% of an 
181. Sychrava, supra note 175, at 48. 
182. As one worker in the state-run People's Bank of China said, "We feel a 
stock market wiii not affect socialism. Most of our shareholders wiii be workers. 
There is no contradiction." Goodspeed, supra note 176, at Fl. 
183. See Zhao & Qian, supra note 169, at 8. Once it was discovered that non-
negotiable debentures were routinely forced by financiaily shaky enterprises upon 
staff members and workers, the State Council, on March 5, 1989, issued a direc-
tive requiring that "internal debenture subscriptions be on a voluntary basis and 
only for short-term working capital needs." Id. 
When faced with the prospect of capital shortages, Beijing, however, has not 
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employee's salary had to be taken in bonds.184 
Despite its inauspicious beginnings, the introduction of 
bonds into the economy presented the government with a 
much-needed opportunity. Bonds represented a noncontrover-
sial financing tool, providing the Chinese government with an 
ideologically compatible vehicle for raising needed capital. Debt 
instruments wholly void of equity interests allowed the govern-
ment to raise money without implicating socialist ownership of 
the means of production and without undermining government 
control of state enterprises.185 In its initial stages, China's 
regulatory regime has exhibited a pronounced preference for 
the use of debt over equity as a financing tool.186 Indeed, 
hesitated to engage in compulsory sales. When it was discovered in May of 1993 
that only 15% of 30 billion renminbi worth of treasury bonds issued by the gov-
ernment had been subscribed, Beijing warned the provinces and cities that unless 
they buy their quota of the entire issuance, they would be barred from listing 
their stocks on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges. Beijing also warned that 
workers would be forced to buy all government bonds that had failed to sell. By 
August, more than 37 billion renminbi worth of treasury bonds were sold. Money 
and Banking: 11.4-Investing in B-Shares, CHINA HAND, Oct. 1, 1993, available in 
LEXIS, WORLD Library, CHINAH File. 
184. Sychrava, supra note 175, at 50. Nevertheless, the fixed returns on these 
internal debt instruments, which are nonnegotiable and carry no promises of own-
ership, did not help create employee incentives. Even when instruments deemed 
shares were distributed to employees, they resembled bonds more than stocks. 
They were "redeemable at specified maturity dates, could be called by the enter-
prise, and did not provide the holder with any voting rights." Bersani, supra note 
6, at 307 n.12. 
185. See OVERHOLT, supra note 26, at 151-56 for an account of the development 
of the bond market in China. Fiscal tightening by the government in the mid-
1980s forced enterprises to issue bonds as a way of subsidizing their own capital 
shortages. Although bonds carry no ownership rights and thus do not endanger 
socialist notions of ownership, Beijing's issuance of treasury bills in 1981 to fi-
nance its modernization drive did constitute a "break with Maoist economic theory, 
which categorically rejected any form of national debt." Schell & Lappin, supra 
note 7, at 728. 
Other types of financing followed and by the end of the 1980s, "the forms 
of state-issued bonds had proliferated: they included government bonds, treasury 
bonds, special project bonds, and value-guaranteed bonds \vith interest rates in-
dexed to inflation." OVERHOLT, supra note 26, at 152. The public's need to trade in 
bonds led to the emergence in 1988 of secondary market trading. Experimenting 
markets initially appeared in seven big cities and later, in 54 cities. Id. By De-
cember 1990, a nation-wide, computerized bond-trading network, the Securities 
Trading Automated Quotations Systems (STAQS) (with the capacity to expand to 
include stocks) was opened. Id. at 155. The presence of a bond market also helped 
curb inflation by absorbing excess money that could have flooded the consumer 
market. Id. at 156. 
186. For an account of China's discriminatory treatment against stocks, see 
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from 1981 to 1988, bonds alone were the driving force behind 
the securities industry.187 
Soon after bonds were introduced and successfully used in 
China as a fundraising tool by the government, in 1984 the 
World Bank proposed a shareholding system in which it recom-
mended that "the enterprises' assets ... be divided into shares 
and owned by several government departments."188 Although 
the "original single ownership system"189 would eventually be 
dispersed into a "multi ownership system,"190 under this pro-
posal, equity interests in a state enterprise would still be held 
by other state-controlled enterprises with enough excess capi-
tal for investment. Enterprises would be converted into 
shareholding companies, with their shares held by other state 
enterprises. 
Even though China's securities legislation has evolved far 
beyond the prescriptions by the World Bank, and despite Chi-
nese regulations which permit private equity ownership, ma-
jority state ownership has continued to dominate China's secu-
Pitman Potter, Shanghai Securities Regulations, E. AsiAN EXECUTIVE REP., Aug. 
15, 1991, at 7, 7. According to Professor Potter, Shanghai's regime is designed to 
restrict private enterprises' access to capital. "In light of the provisions of central 
government bond regulations restricting the capacity of private enterprises to issue 
bonds, these entities must rely heavily on stock issues to raise capital. The more 
stringent controls on stock issues indicate an effort to restrict the ability of private 
enterprises to compete against bond-funded state projects for investor capital." Id. 
at 8 (citation omitted). Requirements for stock issuances are designed to be more 
onerous than those for state bond issuers because bond issuers are generally limit-
ed to government entities and state banks while stock issuers are generally en-
terprises of all kinds, including private enterprises. 
187. Qian, supra note 91, at 66 n.15. 
In December 1991, it was reported that of the 200 billion yuan in securities 
issued to date, over 80% were in the form of bonds. Automated Quotation System 
Helps Securities Trading in China, Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Service, Dec. 5, 
1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, XINHUA File. As part of the campaign 
to elevate bonds above stocks and to curb the growth of stocks, the state council, 
on March 28, 1987, promulgated a notice which declared that: (1) stocks may be 
issued only by a small number of approved collective enterprises; (2) state enter-
prises may not issue stock. Conversely, state enterprises may issue bonds and 
other debt securities. Zhao & Qian, supra note 169, at 8. Clearly, these measures 
were motivated by no reason other than the desire by the state to remain the sole 
owner of state enterprises. 
The first stock issued by a state enterprise occurred in 1986 when the 
state-owned Shenyang Jinbei (Gold Cup) Auto Industrial Shareholding Corporation 
reorganized as a shareholding company. Id. 
188. Qian, supra note 91, at 75. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
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rities market. 191 While the urgent need to raise additional 
capital forced China to experiment with a shareholding system 
"that would transfer portions of state owned enterprises to 
individuals or organizations below the central level,"192 the 
experimentation has been extremely constricted and distorted 
because it had to be conducted within a regulatory framework 
that reformers could defend as complementary to socialist 
ideology. 
3. China's Securities Exchanges: 
The Emerging Regulatory Framework193 
Although the creation of a shareholding system and securi-
ties market reflects an ideological willingness to experiment 
with ownership reform, the experiment has been hampered by 
the Party's insistence that majority state ownership remain 
the irreducible core of all reforms. In an effort to keep intact 
what it considers to be the residual values of social ownership 
of the means of production, the Chinese government has re-
fused to relinquish majority state ownership. A shareholding 
system with the state as majority shareholder allows the state 
to divorce itself from the management operations of the enter-
prise (a step in the same direction as prior attempts towards 
enterprise reform discussed above)194 without risking the loss 
of control. 
This section investigates the development of the Chinese 
stock market and China's manipulation of its shareholding 
system to privatize as a means of state-directed development. 
Although Chinese enterprises had been issuing shares to em-
191. Of all the shares issued on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, approximately 
-70% were in the hands of state or state-controlled enterprises. Ann S. Tyson, 
China Restricts Shanghai Stock Exchange, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 3, 1991, 
at 7. 
192. Schroeder, supra note 178, at 21. 
193. It is not the purpose of this article to study China's securities or company 
legislation. For an excellent examination of the former, see Qian, supra note 91, at 
85-97. For an excellent examination of the latter, see Bersani, supra note 6, at 
307-28. 
194. The separation of the state as owner of a state enterprise from its role as 
manager of the enterprise has been approved at the recent National People's Con-
gress, which adopted a constitutional amendment designating state enterprises as 
"state owned" rather than "state run." See Bersani, supra note 6, at 304-05 n.6; 
see also Preston Torbert, China's Euoluing Company Legislation: A Status Report, 
14 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 2-3 (1993). 
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ployees and outside entities, 195 the idea that shares of state 
owned enterprises196 will be publicly traded by private own-
ers on a stock exchange was not officially considered until 
Beijing had given official sanction to the securities exchanges 
in Shanghai in 1990 and Shenzhen in 1991.197 
195. Companies may be allowed by the government to issue shares without 
being allowed to list those shares on the stock exchanges. Schell & Lappin, supra 
note 7, at 727-28. 
Until 1992, the transformation of Chinese state-owned enterprises into 
shareholding enterprises was done on an ad hoc basis. On July 1, 1994, China's 
new company law became effective and is considered a breakthrough in the 
country's economic reforms. The new national law will play an extremely impor-
tant role in the transformation of China's state enterprises from state-owned enti-
ties into modern, shareholding corporate entities. It also presents new opportuni-
ties and challenges for foreign investors. See Preston Torbert, China's New Compa-
ny Law: Foreign Investment Issues, E. AsiAN EXECUTIVE REP., Aug. 13, 1994, at 7. 
China has had a number of separate forms of corporate enterprises: state-
owned enterprises, nonstate owned enterprises such as TVEs, private enterprises 
and foreign-invested enterprises, each with its own legal regime. The regulations 
on companies are but a first step towards a unified set of legislation on compa-
nies. The new company law will have primarily a gap-filling function, as far as 
foreign investment is concerned, since it appears that it will only have an effect 
on issues not covered by prior legislation. Id. 
196. Not all shares of state-owned enterprises can be publicly traded. See infra 
note 207 and accompanying text. 
197. As is often the case with China, the center of regional initiatives has 
leapt far ahead of the ability of the central authorities to legislate or regulate. 
Even before Shanghai opened China's first national computerized stock exchange, 
over-the-counter markets for equity and bond trading had occurred in Shanghai 
and Shenyang as early as 1986. See Securities Exchange Opens in Shanghai, 
AsiAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1990, at 13. And the first public offering of shares oc-
curred as early as 1984, with the offering of shares in Shanghai Feile Audio. 
Following Shanghai's lead, informal over-the-counter trading of enterprise 
bonds and treasury bills began to proliferate without official authorization or su-
pervision as peddlers began hawking stocks and bonds to investors on street cor-
ners. See Henry R. Zheng, Business Organization and Securities Laws of the 
People's Republic of China, 43 Bus. LAW. 551, 604-19 (1988). In an attempt to give 
some order to the frenzy of trading, Beijing, in 1986, authorized Shenyang to open 
a "stock market," which in reality was nothing more than a cashier's window in a 
bank office and a blackboard listing the prices of a few fixed-interest government 
bonds. Schell & Lappin, supra note 7, at 728. 
Shenzhen too experienced the frenzy of securities trading. Located across 
the border from aggressively entrepreneurial Hong Kong, Shenzhen became a trad-
ing center for smaller, export-oriented enterprises while Shanghai became the 
trading center for securities in larger state enterprises. In 1987, the first public 
issue of equity securities took place in Shenzhen. See Andrew Quinn, China's 
Southern Stock Market Butts Heads with Beijing, Reuter World Service, July 15, 
1991, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, TXPRIM File. By 1992, when the 
upstart regional economic zone decided to open its own stock exchange with or 
without Beijing's official approval, there was little Beijing could do except meekly 
work out a compromise in which Shenzhen agreed to defer its opening until after 
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In an effort to exert some semblance of control over the 
development and governance of the exchanges, both Shanghai 
and Shenzhen have adopted a confusing maze of regulations to 
cover a range of activities including regulations on share issu-
ance, broker-dealers, and stock exchange operations. 198 As 
Shanghai's. Schell & Lapin, supra note 7, at 727. 
Demand for the limited number of listed securities became so great in both 
exchanges that officials in Shanghai and Shenzhen had to adopt a system of num-
bered tickets. The system allowed the ticket purchasers to enter a lottery in which 
the winners alone were entitled to register with a broker for the purchase of list-
ed shares. See Schell & Lappin, supra note 7, at 732. In August of 1992 a riot 
broke out at the Shenzhen stock market when a million hopeful investors stood in 
line to buy five million lottery tickets only to discover that there would not be 
enough tickets to go around. Andrew Browne, China Stocks Surge as Rescue Pack-
age Unveiled, REUTER AsiA-PAC. Bus. REP., Mar. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, 
ASIAPC Library, REUAPB File. 
Despite astronomical demands, the authorities have moved cautiously. When 
Shenzhen first opened its exchange in 1991, only five companies with a book value 
of 200 million renminbi were listed (although approximately 200 enterprises had 
been transformed into shareholding companies ready for listing and although al-
most 520 million yuan worth of stocks had been issued). OVERHOLT, supra note 26, 
at 168; China Curbs Shenzhen Bourse, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 13, 1991, at 
7; Shenzhen Securities Exchange Opens, Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Service, July 
3, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, XINHUA File. By 1992, only 17 com-
panies had succeeded in listing on Shenzhen. Similarly, Shanghai opened with 
seven listed shares in 1991 and by the end of 1992, increased to twenty-six. 
OVERHOLT, supra note 26, at 169. These were but a tiny portion of the more than 
3000 issues that Chinese enterprises were already selling internally to their em-
ployees and over-the-counter to other investors. Schell & Lappin, supra note 7, at 
727. 
198. See Shanghai Securities Transaction Regulations, Dec. 12, 1990, translated 
and microformed on Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, China, 
No. FBIS-CHI-90-245, at 46 (Dec. 20, 1990); see also Provisional Measures of 
Shenzhen Municipality for Administration of the Issue and Trading of Shares, 
June 15, 1991, translated and reproduced in E. AsiAN EXECUTIVE REP., Sept. 15, 
1992, at 21, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, EASIAN File (hereinafter 
Shenzhen Regulations). For a discussion of the Shenzhen regulations, see Pitman 
Potter, The Legal Framework for Securities Market in China: The Challenge of 
Monitoring State Control and Inducing Investor Confidence, 7 CHINA L. REP. 61, 
74-76 (1992). 
There is, in addition, an ancillary set of regulations consisting of notices 
and interim measures. For regulations relating to Shanghai activities, see Detailed 
Implementing Rules for the Measures of Shanghai Municipality for Administration 
of Special Renminbi-Denominated Shares, Nov. 25, 1991, reproduced and translated 
in CHINA HAND, Oct. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, CHINAH File; 
Measures of Shanghai Municipality for Administration of Special Remnibi-Denomi-
nated Shares, Nov. 22, 1991, reproduced and translated in CHINA HAND, Oct. 1, 
1992, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, CHINAH File (covering B shares). 
For regulations relating to Shenzhen activities, see Rules for the Implementation 
of the Interim Procedures for the Administration of Special Stocks in RMB (B-type 
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yet, there is no national securities legislation.199 However, 
the Interim Regulations on the Issue and Trading of Shares 
were passed on April 22, 1993 to alleviate some of the confu-
sion and fill in some of the gaps unaddressed by the Shanghai 
or Shenzhen regulations.200 The following analysis does not 
serve to elucidate all of the regulations enumerated above, but 
rather only those rules and regulations which are relevant to 
an examination of Chinese privatization within the context of 
state sector ownership reform. 
Because China remains ideologically confined by market 
socialism, privatization of state enterprises has involved only a 
minority portion of state enterprise shares. The government 
has been very careful to maintain majority ownership in those 
state enterprises which it has chosen to privatize. Thus, capital 
markets in China have not been permitted to develop or prolif-
erate in a way that will tip the balance of power away from the 
state's dominant role in the economy. As a result, China's 
shareholding system and its securities exchanges are designed 
more to serve the state's financing needs and to reinforce the 
state's position as majority shareholder than to create greater 
transparency of privatized enterprises for the benefit of share-
holders. In this respect, privatization of the state sector has 
not meant the creation of a class of independent capitalist 
investors but instead, the subordination of private capital by 
the state. 
Chinese legislation classifies shares by their holders rather 
Stocks) in Shenzhen City, Dec. 16, 1991, reproduced and translated in CIIINA 
ECON. NEWS, Feb. 3, 1992, at 7; Interim Procedures on Control of Shenzhen Spe· 
cia! (B-Type) RMB Stocks, Dec. 5, 1991, reproduced and translated in CHINA ECON. 
NEWS, Jan. 27, 1992, at 7. 
199. Legal drafters have been working on national securities legislation for 
more than two years, and the document has been through more than ten drafts. 
"Confusion has been compounded by an array of overlapping administrations over· 
seeing the markets. These include China's central bank, the China Securities Reg· 
ulatory Commission and the various stock market officials." Andrew Browne, Argu· 
ments Hold Up China's Securities Law, Reuter Asia-Pac. Bus. Rep., Nov. 29, 1994, 
auailable in LEXIS, WORLD Library, TXTLNE File. 
200. The Interim Regulations supplement the Shanghai and Shenzhen regula· 
tions and consist of eight chapters dealing with issuance and trading of shares 
(Chapter 3: Trading of Shares); takeovers (Chapter 4: Takeover of Listed Compa· 
nies); custody, clearance, and registration of shares (Chapter 5: Custody, Clearance 
and Registration); information disclosure (Chapter 6: Disclosure Obligations of 
Listed Companies); inspection and penalties (Chapter 7: Investigation and Penal· 
ties); and dispute resolution (Chapter 8: Arbitration of Disputes). 
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than their characteristics: state shares, legal person shares, 
individual shares, (collectively, "A shares"), and foreign invest-
ment shares (domestically-listed but overseas-invested stocks, 
known as "B shares"). 201 State shares202 are purchased with 
state assets by governmental departments and usually consti-
tute 50% or more of all the shares issued.203 Because the gov-
ernment has reconciled itself to the separation of management 
from ownership, the governmental department holding the 
state shares does not become involved in the day-to-day man-. 
agement of the enterprise. 204 Legal person shares are owned 
by entities such as companies and institutions.205 Individual 
201. See Shenzhen Regulations, supra note 198, art. 33. 
"A" shares are held by domestic investors whereas "B" shares are held by 
foreign investors. Until the beginning of 1992, shares on both the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges were denominated in the local currency, the renminbi, 
and were open only to Chinese entities and individuals. In early 1992, both ex-
changes allowed foreigners to invest in Chinese enterprises through special issues 
of B shares. While A shares are sold in renminbi to Chinese nationals only, B 
shares, denominated in renminbi, are subscribed for and traded in foreign curren-
cy. 
While both shares are subjected to the same obligations, dividends on B 
shares must be paid in foreign exchange (U.S. dollars in Shanghai and Hong Kong 
dollars in Shenzhen). Dividends on A shares are paid in renminbi. At the present 
time, there is no provision for the conversion of A shares to B shares or vice 
versa, and the government has indicated that this will not be possible until the 
yuan is fully convertible. It must be noted that although the new company law 
adopted on July 1, 1994, does not specifically abolish the share distinction system, 
it does not call for specific share legislation. 
202. The question that China has wrestled with from the outset, as reflected in 
an internal report to the National People's Congress Standing Committee, is the 
following: "state-owned enterprises are gradually changing to the shareholding 
system and are listing one after another. Given the fact that 'state-owned shares' 
are tokens of public ownership, should we legislate to protect them to prevent the 
state from losing controlling power over those enterprises?" Article Views Debate on 
Formulation of Securities Act, British Broadcasting Corp. Summary of World 
Broadcasts, Mar. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, TBBCSW File. 
203. Qian, supra note 91, at 87. 
There had been some rumors that state officials might be willing to allow 
state enterprises to be "quasi-privatized" once the enterprises change from state to 
shareholding status. Quasi-privatization would mean that the state would make 
radical concessions on the question of property rights and ownership. In that case, 
state holdings in the new shareholding company could be as little as 20% or even 
15%. See China to Cut State Holdings to 20%, Paper Says, Japan Econ. Newswire, 
Dec. 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, JEN File. 
204. See, e.g., Christine Chan, Calls Growing to End China's Share Classes, S. 
CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 3, 1993, (Business), at 1, available in LEXIS, News 
Libr:ary, SCHINA File. Matthew Bersani, Stock Companies in China: An Alterna-
tive Format for Foreign Investment?, E. AsiAN EXECUTIVE REP., July 15, 1993, at 
9. 
205. Legal persons shares are frequently held by local governmental organiza-
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shares are owned by either the employees of the company or by 
third parties in the general public. The classification of shares 
based on the identity of the shareholder has allowed the gov-
ernment to ensure that its dominance will not be threatened 
by other holders of stock. As a result, the securities market has 
resulted in majority ownership by the state and a maximum of 
35% ownership by foreigners.206 
To further ensure state majority ownership remains intact, 
only individual shares of listed companies can be traded on the 
exchanges.207 Clearly, the illiquidity of state owned shares 
"makes it difficult for stock markets to exercise their function 
of adjusting state owned assets structurally."208 This problem 
tions or subsidiaries of state enterprises. Roberta S. Kannel, Tossing Capitalism in 
Shanghai, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 19, 1993, at 4. 
206. By contrast, the Polish plan for privatization, having made a decisive 
break from the vestiges of socialism, consists of a shareholding system in which 
the state is expected to retain but a minority interest. Each of the 500 largest 
state enterprises scheduled for privatization, for example, will be converted into a 
shareholding format; 10% of the shares will be given free of charge to the work-
ers, 30% retained by the state, and the remaining 60% transferred to new owners 
through privatization vouchers. FRYDI\IAN & RAPACZ\'NSKI, supra note 14, at 63. 
Under this model, free vouchers received by the populace will be used to "pur-
chase" shares in a number of intermediary institutions such as investment and 
restructuring funds. Once the vouchers are transferred to the intermediaries, the 
companies will then be sold at an auction. The intermediaries which win the bid 
become legal owners of the shares of the privatized enterprises. The individuals, in 
turn, hold the shares of the intermediaries. Id. at 30. The state's shares will be 
deposited with the intermediaries who will be charged with selling those shares, 
either by private placement or in the open market. Id. at 64. 
207. Andrew Browne, China Announces Stock Market Rescue, Prices Surge, 
Reuter Asia-Pac. Bus. Rep., Mar. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, 
REUAPB File; see also Ren Kan, Domestic Investors to Get Share of Huge Stock 
Issue, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, TXTLNE 
File. An additional means for ensuring that the state retains its dominance is a 
restriction on the number of shares individual shareholders are allowed to pur-
chase. Under the Shanghai rules, one single individual shareholder cannot pur-
chase shares equaling more than .5% of the total shares issued. Qian, supra note 
91, at 87 n.102. 
208. Foo Choy Peng, 5.5b Shares Planned for Mainlanders, S. CHINA MORNING 
POST, Jan. 20, 1994, (Business), at 4, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, 
SCHINA File. As the above quote by Liu Hongru, chairperson of the China Securi-
ties Regulatory Commission, reveals, Chinese officials do in fact realize that public 
listings would "enhance the transparency of the market by ensuring the full dis-
closure of information." Id. However, the "problem must be gradually solved be-
cause it has a bearing on the property rights system of state-owned assets and 
the business administration system." Id. 
A proposal has been put forth that would allow state-owned shares to be 
traded yet at the same time protect the state's interest in retaining control. Under 
this plan, state-held shares can be traded, but the state retains the right to re-
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can easily be solved by allowing state owned shares to be trad-
ed. However, despite repeated suggestions that shares owned 
by the state and by legal persons be merged with shares owned 
by individuals,209 and presumably publicly traded, the gov-
ernment has steadfastly held to the original design, except in 
one rare instance.210 Hence, although the majority of A 
deem the shares within five years. "[T]he proposal would enable state-held shares 
to effectively realise their value, improve a company's shareholding structure and 
avoid loss of state-owned property." Chan, supra note 204, at 1. Should the state 
elect not to exercise its right to redeem the shares within the allotted time period, 
it would do so because it believes a better return could be achieved on other in-
vestments. Id. 
209. Browne, supra note 207. Legal persons are among those most eager for 
the merging of shares. Originally promised at the time of purchase that their 
shares would be eventually listed, they have been anxious to cash in on their 
stock investments. Id. 
China has been studying the poss~bility of listing corporate-owned shares. 
Although only individual shares are publicly traded on the securities exchanges, a 
small number of corporate-owned shares have been listed on the Securities Trad-
ing Automated Quotations System (STAQ) and National Electric Trading System 
(NETS). Kan, supra note 207. Because speculation about the possible listing of 
state-owned shares and corporate shares have continued to fuel investors' worries 
that such listings may result in another dive in share prices, the government 
publicly announced in January of 1994 that such listings will not occur in the 
near future. Liu Weiling, China: Wariness Reigns Among Stock Investors, Bus. WK. 
(China Daily Supp.), Jan. 30, 1994, available in LEXIS, WORLD Library, TXTLNE 
File. 
Calls to allow the free transfer of state shares and to abolish the distinction 
between the different classes of shares have not been directed only at the current 
distinctions within the A shares market. There have been suggestions calling for 
the merger of A and B shares as well, which would require a freely convertible 
yuan. Until the yuan can be made freely convertible, however, it has been sug-
gested that Chinese investors holding foreign currency should be allowed to buy B 
shares and vice versa. Chan, supra note 204, at 1. 
One reason for allowing domestic investors to buy B shares would be to add 
some fire to the cool B shares market. Some discrepancy in valuation has arisen 
between the two shares, so that while A shares of a company trade at a certain 
point, B shares of the same company trade at a much lower value. Chinese inves-
tors with an excess of yuan are .eager to invest in almost any financial instru-
ment-thus demand far outstrips supply. By contrast, foreign investors graced with 
a wide range of investment options are less likely to put up with the inadequate 
regulations governing the Chinese market. Inefficient Markets?, ECONOMIST, July 
31, 1993, at 70. 
While China's legal scholars and economists debate the point, classifications 
based on the identities of shareholders remain. 
210. When Shanghai Dazhong Taxi announced a novel scheme to convert some 
of its legal person shares into B shares for foreign investors, the plan was at first 
rejected by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. Browne, supra note 207. 
The state's initial rejection reflects the state's fear that foreign firms would gain 
too much control of an enterprise. Conversion of legal person shares into B shares 
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shares in most listed companies are state owned, they are not 
traded.211 Legal person shares held by institutions can only 
be traded on a separate, electronic network.212 Individual 
shares can be traded, but they constitute only a fraction of 
shares issued by a listed company.213 Clearly, ensuring state 
dominance is much more important to the government than 
ensuring the efficient and transparent workings of a capital 
market. 
Aside from the separation of shares by reference to their 
owners, China has been tenacious in protecting the state's 
interest in other respects as well.214 When reformers consid-
would increase the supply of B shares by 37-40% on both the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen exchanges-hence the fear expressed by a spokesperson for the China 
Securities Regulatory Committee that "opening A shares to foreigners amounted to 
a sell-out of state property rights .... " Ivan Tong, Dazhong's B-share Plan Ve-
toed, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
SCHINA File. 
However, in the end, Dazhong Taxi did win approval to test the controver-
sial conversion of legal person shares into B shares, a move which will give for-
eigners a majority stake in the company. Id. The Shanghai Securities Administra-
tion has noted that foreigners must still comply with existing regulations and that 
although the merging of all shares is inevitable, there is a long way to go because 
many important details still need to be worked out, the most important of which 
is a freely convertible yuan. Zheng Jie, China: Swap of Corporate Shares into B is 
Only Experiment, Reuter, SHANGHAI STAR, July 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, 
WORLD Library, TXTLNE File. 
It should also be noted that Dazhong Taxi won the right to convert legal 
person shares into B shares only because as a taxi operating company, it was not 
considered a key industry. Id. 
211. One reason for state majority ownership and nontransferability of state 
shares is to prevent buyout by foreign firms. Chan, supra note 204, at 1. 
212. Kan, supra note 207. 
213. Another trade-off that results from the illiquidity of state shares is the 
small number of shares that are actually traded, potentially resulting in a market 
more susceptible to manipulation. See Andrew Browne, Currency Fears May Stall 
Chinese Share Reform, Reuters World Service, Jan. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, 
ASIAPC Library, REUWLD File. 
214. Beijing issued a circular requiring publicly listed companies to safeguard 
the interests of the state when issuing new shares. According to the circular, state 
shareholders, usually an administrative organ or a government department, were 
being discriminated against by companies which asked the state shareholders to 
relinquish their right to buy new shares. While other shareholders were entitled to 
bonus issues, state-owned shares were only awarded cash bonuses, resulting in a 
dilution of state shares and state control. State Defends Rights as Shareholder, S. 
CHINA MORNING POST, April 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA 
File. 
State shareholders were also admonished that "'(w]hen there is a decision 
for a bonus issue or placement during a shareholders' meeting, government rep-
resentatives who hold shares must safeguard state interest-they cannot blindly 
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ered other experimental measures inimical to the principle of 
majority state ownership, the government did not hesitate to 
exercise its central authority to ensure the primacy and sancti-
ty of state shares. When Shenzhen issued a regulation allow-
ing state enterprises to trade their 1994 bonus shares six 
months after issue, the central government quickly moved to 
quash the brazenly renegade move. As Zhu Li, spokesperson 
for the Securities Regulatory Committee said, "trading in 
shares other than those held by individuals is banned because 
it involves aspects of transfer of national property rights."215 
Not only has the state maintained control over state enter-
prises listed on the stock exchange, it has also carved out a 
role for itself as architect of the stock exchange. Thus, under 
current Chinese practice, it is the state which controls the 
number and type of enterprises that will become shareholding 
companies, and which among those shareholding companies 
will be allowed to be listed. 216 It is no surprise that under the 
present rules, each Chinese province is allocated a strict annu-
al quota of shares for listing in Shanghai or Shenzhen. 217 
Despite strict state control, China's securities market has 
performed its designated fundraising functions218 by absorb-
agree with the decision.'" ld. (quoting circular issued by the State Assets Adminis-
trative Bureau of Beijing). ' 
215. Beijing Slaps Southern Bourse on Rogue Reform, Reuter Eur. Bus. Rep., 
Mar. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, BUSFIN Library, REUEUB File. "Allowing 
state-held bonus shares to trade on the open market would inevitably erode the 
state's holdings and eventually could undermine its majority ownership[.]" Id. 
216. Kan, supra note 207. The state selects which domestic firms are allowed 
to list A shares on the domestic as well as which domestic firms are allowed to 
list on overseas exchanges. ld.; see also Peng, supra note 208, at 4. 
The state also sets the total number of shares that can be issued to domes-
tic investors. According to Ma Zhongzhi of the State Council Securities Policy 
Committee, "'[t]he figure [is] set after fully considering the stock market's capaci-
ty.'" Kan, supra note 207. 
217. Browne, supra note 207. 
218. For example, when Shanghai Vacuum Electron Device Co. issued one mil-
lion B shares on the market in December 1991, the shares were sold within one 
day. Schell & Lappin, supra note 7, at 739. The supply for B shares could barely 
meet the demand. Shenbao Industrial Corporation's issuance of $1.34 million worth 
of B shares on the Shenzhen Securities Exchange in June 1992 was immediately 
over-subscribed. Overseas investors flooded the market with $112 million in sub-
scription funds, or about 80 times the par value of available securities. Id. 
When the securities market was opened to foreign investment at the end of 
1991, foreign investors reacted enthusiastically by launching over 20 China funds 
by the first half of 1992, raising more than $1 billion for investment in listed 
securities as well as securities in unlisted companies. Julia Sze, The Allure of B 
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ing capital into enterprises steadfastly controlled by the state. 
Regardless of whether the· purpose of the securities system is 
to raise capital for the state, to control renegade private capi-
tal, or to convert inert mattress money into investment re-
sources, the system has accomplished its objective with distinc-
tion. 
Established for the purpose of pursuing very specific eco-
nomic goals, the securities system has been driven by a set of 
economic imperatives forced upon the state by a bloated and 
constantly cash-starved state sector.219 The issuance of A 
shares has allowed the state to privatize by offering shares to 
domestic investors while the issuance of B shares has attracted 
much needed foreign exchange from foreign shareholders. 
When the B share market did not attract as much foreign 
exchange as originally contemplated, China swiftly acted to 
increase its access to foreign money by listing Chinese state 
enterprises on the stock exchanges of Hong Koni20 and New 
York.221 Thus, it is interesting to note that the government's 
Shares, CHINA BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 42, 42. 
It has been estimated that there is $1.6 billion in stock market capitaliza-
tion for Chinese equities. The Rise of the Red Chip, EUROMONEY: INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTORS' GUIDE TO AsiAN ISSUERS & CAPITAL MARKETS, Dec. 1993, at 23, 23 
(Supp.). 
219. Of course, fundraising by attracting domestic and foreign capital will also 
mean by necessity increasing productivity and boosting profits. Particularly, at-
tracting foreign capital will have to mean a revamping of the current system to a 
more transparent one more capable of producing solid financial data that meets 
international standards of disclosure, all of which would, theoretically, result in 
more shareholder protection. 
220. In an effort to expand fundraising potentials, in October 1992, China re-
leased a list of nine companies chosen as the first mainland-based companies to 
seek direct listing in Hong Kong. Sze, supra note 218, at 48. In 1993, China ear-
marked another 22 companies for international listing. 
Maanshan Iron & Steel Company was one of the nine chosen to issue what 
has become known as "H" shares in Hong Kong. Instead of accessing foreign capi-
tal either through government loans or joint ventures with foreign investors, the 
company was allowed to list in an overseas market. In one of the largest public 
listing for a Chinese company in Hong Kong, the company raised $505 million. 
The Rise of The Red Chip, supra note 218, at 23. 
221. In October 1992, China Brilliance Automotive became the first Chinese 
company (though registered in Bermuda) to list on the New York Stock Exchange. 
By year's end, its stock price climbed 80%. Sze, supra note 218, at 48. 
The first company registered in China to be traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange was Shanghai Petrochemical, the largest petrochemical enterprise in Chi-
na, which processes crude oil into a broad range of synthetic fibers and plastics. 
See Michael Hirsh, Anatomy of a Privatization, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (lnt'l Ed.), 
Apr. 1994, at 86. 
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solution to foreign reluctance to purchase B shares is not nec-
essarily to improve the B share market or the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. Rather, the government's solution 
is simply to find another way to access foreign capital. This is 
in stark contrast to the fact that no foreign company has been 
allowed to tap into China's domestic capital and list on China's 
exchanges. 222 
State dominance of the securities market has resulted in a 
number of severe distortions. The financing functions of the 
securities market which are designed to serve solely the state's 
financial needs have been overemphasized at the expense of 
other objectives. For example, the need to establish a compe-
tent and well-regulated system of corporate governance, the 
implementation of an effective ownership structure, and man-
agement accountability are all areas which have been ignored 
while the state continued its fundraising campaign.223 In this 
Chinese companies, such as China Tire and Rubber, China Erfangji and 
Shanghi Chlor-Alkali, and other companies who are B share issuers in the China 
market, are presently looking for avenues besides the issuance of B shares to tap 
the U.S. market. For example, these companies conduct offerings to qualified insti-
tutional buyers in the form of American Depository Receipts using the 144a ex-
emption to the U.S. federal securities laws. The Rise of the Red Chip, supra note 
218, at 24. 
222. Reports of planned listings by blue chip firms such as Germany's Daimler-
Benz and Hong Kong's Bank of East Asia have piqued mainland investors' inter-
ests. After years of negotiations, Daimler-Benz finally confirmed its plans to be-
come the first foreign company to list on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. As a 
general rule, however, China, does not currently allow the listing of foreign firms 
on the mainland, nor will the much-awaited national Securities Law cover such 
listings. Christine Chan, Mainland Stock Markets Fear an Exodus of Funds, S. 
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 1, 1994, (Business), at 7, available in LEXIS, News 
Library, SCHINA File. Zhang Ning, vice director of the Shanghai Securities Ad-
ministration Office, said there were mixed feelings about allowing foreign compa-
nies to list in Shanghai: "'We don't have much investment capital in China. If 
companies are looking to raise cash, it would make much more sense for them to 
do it in the West.'" Browne, supra note 213. 
223. Reports of "unorthodox" practices (to put it euphemistically) on the state's 
part, have been rampant. For example, according to officials of the Shanghai Vacu-
um Electron Device Co., although the Shanghai municipal government owns 75% 
of its stock, it has never paid for the shares. Nonetheless, it has received divi-
dends on them! Schroeder, supra note 178, at 21. 
Numerous complaints about company compliance with standard and basic 
regulations have also been received by the China Securities Regulatory Commis-
sion. Commission chairperson, Liu Hongru, acknowledged that "'[c]omplaints have 
been received on companies failing to make improvements on their operations as 
promised in their listing prospectuses.'" Christine Chan, Quality of Listed Stocks 
Must be· Raised, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, 
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respect, state sector privatization has been a disappointment, 
primarily because it has been constrained by the ideological 
dictate of state majority ownership and motivated by the over-
riding belief that private shareholders exist to serve the state's 
needs. 
4. Future Privatization in China 
While ''better" privatization is obviously called for, should 
the government opt for more privatization? The answer to this 
question depends on the following fundamental factors: (1) 
what will more privatization achieve, or what does the govern-
ment hope to achieve with more privatization; (2) whether the 
purpose can be accomplished by means other than more privat-
ization; and (3) what the costs of more privatization may be 
and whether they are palatable to the Chinese government. 
At the present time, China has flatly ruled out any large-
scale privatization of the kind that exists in Eastern European 
countries.224 More privatization has been suggested because it 
is believed that it is the only solution to the problem of soft 
budget constraints. Yet if feasible alternatives to privatization, 
such as increased marketization, competition, and innovation, 
can harden the budget, then perhaps more privatization is not 
necessarily the first and only solution to severing the vicious 
cycle of enterprise loss and government subsidies. 
In this regard, there are some positive signs that Chinese 
state enterprises have responded competitively to the injection 
of market forces into the economy. Additionally, Chinese prov-
inces have become progressively less willing to expend precious 
News Library, SCHINA File. "'To most of the companies, issuing and listing 
shares is solely with the aim of raising cash. Improvements in the management 
structure and obligations of shareholders are always thrown behind.'" Id. 
Other shareholder complaints include ignoring original plans for share issue 
proceeds, failing to keep shareholders informed of company developments, id., and 
paying shareholders very small dividends despite highly priced rights issues. 
Weiling, supra note 209. 
224. As early as 1991, the Communist Party announced that it would oppose 
such sweeping economic restructuring. See George White, Chinese Economic Re· 
form: Is It Enough?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1991, at D3. 
The state has been more willing to sell small and medium-sized enterprises. 
In 1993, about 10,000 were sold, transferred, or merged, according to the State 
Commission for Economic Restructuring. China: Struggling Firms Sold to Increase 
Efficiency, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 26, 1994, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, 
TXPRIM File. 
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funds to subsidize bankrupt state firms. The growth of mar-
kets and the mounting pressures posed by competition have 
meant that government intervention through subsidies is no 
longer automatic. For example, Chinese provinces must now 
compete with one another for access to domestic and foreign 
capital.225 Since expenditures for subsidies mean that less 
money will be available to finance profitable and investment-
friendly ventures such as airports, telecommunications, and 
other necessary infrastructure projects, subsidies as a solution 
to inefficiency have progressively less appeal. The message to 
state enterprises is, of course, to look to the market and not 
the government for financial salvation. 
Furthermore, if limited state sector privatization can gen-
erate sufficient capital to make up for the losses sustained by 
money-losing enterprises, then perhaps more privatization is 
not required. This, of course is a big "if." 
Even if more privatization is economically mandatory, the 
social ramifications attached to such an endeavor could be so 
great that the government may be unwilling to tolerate them. 
After all, state companies still employ more than 100 million 
workers and function like "virtual mini-welfare states"226 pro-
viding cradle-to-grave social services for workers and their 
families. Even if privatization is done in the name of compas-
sionate destruction, legitimate fears exist that it will inevitably 
lead to a showdown between cost cutting on the one hand and 
225. Rawski, supra note 148, at 40. 
226. Hirsh, supra note 221, at 86. Yizheng Chemical Fiber Co., for example, 
earmarked for privatization, that is, for a private placement of a 29.4% stake of 
the company in Europe, the United States and Japan, has performed many of the 
traditional social welfare tasks for its workers, such as running schools, a day care 
center, a park, and a hospital. Id.; see also Privatizing China's State Sector: Anoth-
er Long March?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, May 1993, at 74. 
Only the best companies can be earmarked for listing. "Best" is equated 
with biggest, according to Rolf Gerber, president of the Hong Kong based invest-
ment bank SBCI Finance Asia. The biggest companies in China will also be com-
panies that are "'half cities, with hospitals, fire departments and schools,"' or com-
panies that also perform "auxiliary services" such as employing surplus labor, not 
just the "productive core" that foreign investors want to privatize. Id. at 75. 
The Chinese government and international investors have sought to control 
the problem of "corporate mini-welfare states" by restructuring the enterprise to be 
listed and splitting the business function of the enterprise from its social services 
sector. Thus, the investor is buying a new, restructured company, which contains 
only the actual business operations. The social sector of the old corporation is also 
restructured into a new entity, which is still wholly owned by the state. 
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full employment on the other.227 Thus, more privatization, or, 
at least, more responsible privatization, may be a viable option 
only after the construction and institution of a social safety 
net.22s 
State sector privatization has presented especially difficult 
questions for China's interior provinces which attract much 
less foreign investment than its more prosperous coastal ar-
eas.229 The reluctance to subject the state sector to market 
discipline has meant that of the more than one-hundred thou-
sand state companies in China,230 45% of which are losing 
money,231 fewer than five-hundred firms have been allowed to 
227. As noted, Beijing is "showing an unapparent unwillingness to suffer 
capitalism's downside: unemployment." Privatizing China's State Sector: Another 
Long March?, supra note 226, at 74. Bruce Murray, the Asian Development Bank's 
program manager for China, stated that "'[d)ealing with redundant labor is a ma-
jor problem. The Chinese are taking a step-by-step approach, as opposed to the 
"big bang" seen in Eastern Europe and Russia.'" Id. at 75. 
Currently, however, as the government is beginning to implement reform 
measures which include allowing state enterprises to become bankrupt, workers 
have staged sit-ins and other protests, testing the government's resolve to balance 
reform with social stability. Mark O'Neill, China Workers Protest at Bankruptcy, 
Reuter Asia-Pac. Bus. Rep., Oct. 28, 1994, at 8, 8, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC 
Library, REUAPB File. 
228. As Wang Shiyuan, Secretary General of China's State Commission for 
Restructuring the Economic Systems reported in a government publication, "'Only 
when the social security system is established and perfected can enterprise reform 
be further deepened and a system realized in which efficient enterprises prosper 
and inefficient ones fail.'" Blustein, supra note 27, at A27. 
When Chongqing, a city located in the interiors of Sichuan Province, laid off 
2,000 workers from the largest state-owned knitting mill as part of a restructuring 
and reorganization effort to bring the factory out of insolvency, the workers 
marched on city hall and threatened to riot. The city responded by hiring 800 of 
the jobless workers as street sweepers. Patrick Tyler, Overhaul of China's State 
Industry at a Standstill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1994, at A12. 
229. For example, Sichuan Province which is located in China's inland, attract-
ed $850 million in pledged foreign investment in 1993. By contrast, Guangdong 
Province, which is located along the coast adjacent to Hong Kong, attracted $9.65 
billion. Tyler, supra note 228, at A12. Yet, when Sichuan Province sought to di-
vest itself of the financial burdens linked to its money-losing state enterprises by 
proposing to privatize thirty-three state firms, the plan was not approved by 
Beijing, which feared worker unrest and political instability. Id. 
230. Depending on the source and the manner of classification, the number of 
state companies has fluctuated. It has been estimated that China still has more 
than 400,000 state-owned enterprises employing SO million workers. The largest of 
the state enterprises, 11,000 of them, cost the state approximately $26 billion a 
year in subsidies, more than China spends on public health and education. 
Blustein, supra note 27, at A27. It has been estimated that state subsidies consti-
tute approximately 14% of the government's revenue. A Survey of China: When 
China Wakes, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1992, at 63, 10. 
231. Official statistics may actually understate the problem. While it has gener-
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go bankrupt,232 although a bankruptcy law was passed as 
early as 1989.233 Also, only four-thousand state companies 
have become shareholding enterprises as of the end of 1993, 
and only 200 have been allowed to list on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen exchanges. 234 
However, the government has earmarked state sector 
reform as the number one priority for 1995. It has vowed to 
use the bankruptcy law as well as other devices to prod slug-
gish enterprises into either profitability or extinction.235 
Clearly, the government is trying to deal with the problem that 
haunts Eastern Europe and Russia today, namely what to do 
with state enterprises that were once national treasures but 
ally been acknowledged that approximately one-third of China's state enterprises 
are chronically losing money, the actual number of losses, disguised by accounting 
methods, may be twice that amount. A Survey of China: When China Wakes, su-
pra note 230, at 9-10. 
232. Bankruptcy would unleash a forceful and tsunamic domino effect. Most 
enterprises are entangled in a web of interfirm debt, one enterprise owing money 
to another enterprise resulting in complicated linkages of debt among firms. In 
addition to interfirm debt within the state sector, the state sector itself is inextri-
cably linked to a primitive and inefficient banking system. In order to keep loans 
viable, at least on the book, state banks have to keep lending to money-losing 
state enterprises at low interest, with little prospect of being repaid, so that the 
banks themselves can appear to be operating in the black. 
Privatizing the state sector would require not only reforming the financial 
sector but the social service functions currently provided by the large state enter-
prises as well. Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union face a similar set of 
insoluble contradictions. Stabilizing the price level is incompatible with 
keeping the 'white elephants' alive with unrepayable credits. But closing 
them could inflame the already smoldering popular discontent, since the 
state enterprises not only employ a large share of the work force, but 
also supply much of the social services through job-connected housing, 
schools, clinics and recreational facilities. 
David Felix, Smith and Machiavelli Go to Moscow: Further Observations on Radi-
cal Reform, 37 CHALLENGE 48, 50 (1994). 
The difference between the former Eastern bloc and China, of course, is 
that a robust nonstate sector is in place in China to alleviate at least some of the 
shock that state sector restructuring would unleash. China also has established a 
successful regime of export trade on the one hand and foreign investment on the 
other, both of which may provide additional sources of employment. 
233. Hirsh, supra note 221, at 86. A bankruptcy law was adopted by the Sixth 
National People's Congress on December 2, 1986. See Henry R. Zheng, Bankruptcy 
Law of the People's Republic of China: Principle, Procedure & Practice, 19 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 683 (1986). 
234. Hirsh, supra note 221, at 86. 
235. Jeffrey Parker, China Told Not to Fear Foreign Stake in State Sector, 
Reuter Asia-Pac. Bus. Rep., Nov. 18, 1994, available in, LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, 
REUAPB File. 
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that are now economic liabilities, without causing a collapse of 
other institutions. By privatizing its state enterprises slowly 
and cautiously and allowing private interests only a minority 
equity ownership, China apparently hopes to retain control 
over the growth and direction of state enterprises as well as 
the speed and conditions under which they are privatized. 
Like other transitional economies, China finds itself in a 
catch-22 situation. State sector privatization could be 
destabilizing but the cost of avoiding it may be even greater. 
For example, private sector income growth, which enters the 
state's banking system as savings, is being converted into low-
interest loans by the state to subsidize state sector losses. 236 
Currently, almost 80% of all bank loans are being fed into the 
state sector.237 
For the reasons suggested above, China could improve 
privatization, both from a fundraising and a market efficiency 
perspective by implementing a few simple changes in the cur-
rent securities system. These changes could include allowing 
more enterprises already converted to shareholding companies 
to list, permitting private and institutional investors to pur-
chase a greater percentage of shares issued, and increasing the 
number of shares publicly tradeable on the stock exchanges. If 
and when the government decides to privatize the bulk of its 
state enterprises in order to slow the demand for bailouts and 
subsidies, the institutional framework of the nonstate sector 
and the market-supportive institutions already established 
should minimize the shock of privatization as well as maximize 
the benefits. Market forces already in place and the existing 
market-responsive environment will no doubt amplify the ben-
efits that privatization itself is supposed to provide. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Chinese model of privatization was designed to avoid 
the institutional vacuum associated with shock therapy reform. 
AE Senator Diane Feinstein has remarked in reference to the 
Russian privatization model, "I have a basic concern about 
whether it's practical and even possible to assume that a coun-
try can go from a tightly-centralized economy with low produc-
236. Tyler, supra note 228, at A12. 
237. Id. 
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tion standards to a rapid and total release of centralized con-
trol and still maintain its standard ofliving."238 
Perhaps because China shared the same doubts, it has 
decided to privatize in phases and avoid the rapid and imme-
diate privatization of the state sector that has defined the 
Eastern European model. As such, the Chinese model of pri-
vatization means, first fostering the growth of a nascent, 
nonstate sector which consists of a combination of private, 
quasi-private, collective, and foreign-invested enterprises. The 
engine for entrepreneurial innovation and growth is not sup-
posed to come from a collapse of the older order, but from the 
creation of a sector of newly-formed companies, aided by the 
removal of governmental barriers as well as the interfirm pro-
duction chains synergistically provided by the existing state 
sector. China, in other words, has taken advantage of existing 
institutional resources founded in the state sector to construct 
a nonstate sector which has been largely responsible for a 
spectacular economic growth averaging 8.8% since 1979. 
Skepticism regarding the benefits of wholesale _privatiza-
tion and reluctance to absorb large transition costs have led 
China to explore alternatives to state sector privatization. The 
introduction of market forces, the reassignment of property 
rights, the institution of enterprise reform, and the emphasis 
on managerial incentives and accountability have made state 
enterprises operate more competitively and efficiently. The 
interaction of state and private domains has created a 
transformative process in which institutions themselves have 
been reshaped and their behavior strategically reoriented in 
response to an entirely new set of market-oriented rules. Thus, 
although the goal has not been to reproduce capitalism or 
Western markets, the reconfiguration process has contributed 
to the formation of a functioning market which state sector 
privatization alone is supposed to provide. 
China is currently in its third phase of reform-state sec-
tor privatization. Ownership reform meant restructuring state 
enterprises into a shareholding system, first t9 allow the state 
to absorb and control what it deemed an excess pool of private 
238. Foreign Operation, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropria-
tions: Hearings on H.R. 4426 Before the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, S. HRG. 
No. 760, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1994). 
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capital; second, to convert idle domestic savings into invest-
ment capital; and finally to alleviate the burdens exerted on 
the state budget. Additionally, equity investment by private 
shareholders is also seen as a way to make state enterprises 
more efficient and profitable, and most importantly, more self-
sufficient. A functioning securities market and stock exchange 
is seen as a way of forcing state enterprises to become more 
transparent, by developing clearly articulated business goals, 
regularly audited financial reports, a more direct sense of man-
agerial accountability, and other informational disclosure re-
quirements necessary to attract investment from the securi-
ties-holding public. 
Although the current Chinese securities framework is 
skewed in favor of state majority interests at the expense indi-
vidual shareholders, the Chinese model of privatization has 
succeeded in bypassing the Russian and Eastern European 
problem of ''how to sell property that belongs to nobody and 
has no value, to people who have no money."239 Nonetheless, 
it may be unwise at this time to conclude that either system of 
reform is better. China has gone about the business of creating 
economic growth while suppressing debate on any political 
alternatives that may undermine Party rule. Conversely, the 
former Eastern bloc has focused on the "political and economic 
consequences of various blueprints for a final economic transi-
tion-in some cases while their economies collapse around 
them."240 The purpose of this Article is not to issue a pre-
scriptive conclusion that economic development should take 
precedence over political liberalization or vice versa. Rather, it 
is to call into question the current fetishistic role state sector 
privatization has played in reforming centrally planned econo-
mies and to expand the terms of debate by offering alterna-
tives to the dominant Eastern European paradigm. 
In this respect, the Chinese model challenges a number of 
orthodox but unarticulated assumptions. The discourse on 
transitional economies has occurred within a narrow frame-
work which assumes that the failure of centralized socialism 
and the seeming economic superiority of capitalism means that 
239. Jan Prybyla, The Interplay of Economics and Politics: The Transformation 
of Social Systems, VITAL SPEECHES, July 15, 1993, at 60, available in LEXIS, 
News Library, ASIAPII File. 
240. Walder, supra note 93, at 64. 
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the eventual destination for all economies must be Western-
style capitalism. According to this orthodox view, even though 
transitional economies may exhibit differences, they are merely 
differences in strategy and degree, speed and timing. IDtimate-
ly, the common end point is presumed to be the reproduction of 
some versions of a U.S. or Western-style economy. China's 
model of privatization presents a contrast to the assumption 
that all transitional economies are destined toward the same 
goal. 
Additionally, it has been assumed that such an economy 
can best be implemented by state sector privatization. Al-
though divesting the state of its assets and transferring them 
into private hands may create a temporary institutional vacu-
um, the act of privatization itself, it is believed, will put in 
place mechanisms that make up an efficient market economy. 
Under this theory, privatization is an absolute imperative, 
even in the absence of an already established market frame-
work. Privatization is considered a prerequisite for market-
oriented reform because it is believed that only privatization 
can correct the inefficiencies of centrally planned economies. 
Anything less than a complete rupture of state ownership will 
result in a mutilated and half-transformed economy. 
The Chinese model has proved the above assumptions to 
be false. Systemic transformation can occur even in the ab-
sence of wholesale state sector privatization. Even within the 
state sector, property rights such as the right to above-quota 
income among various economic actors can be significantly 
altered, from the state downward to the enterprise and then to 
the individual with beneficial consequences. Moreover, con-
trary to the dominant model of privatization which has widely 
assumed that state property rights must be divested, sustained 
growth has been achieved by TVEs founded on a socially-based 
system of ownership with direct ties to active local govern-
ments. 
The success of TVEs has in turn called into question neo-
classical dogma about the dichotomy between public and pri-
vate ownership. While China may be an increasingly 
marketized economy, it is not a predominantly private econo-
my. While reliance on the market has reduced the role of cen-
tral planning and increased output and growth, reliance on the 
state, particularly local governments, has contributed to this 
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economic efficacy as well.241 Just as there are numerous ecb-
nomic models in the West, there is no reason to believe that 
the same diversity of possibilities cannot exist in transitional 
economies. 
In sum, what the Chinese experience has demonstrated is 
that the creation of an emerging nonstate sector with new 
economic entities is a viable alternative to the immediate and 
mass privatization of the state sector. The Chinese experience 
has also proved that competitive organization and economic 
growth can be spawned by an unorthodox public-private model 
of privatization. Moreover, competitive economic organizations 
do not have to be either private or public but a combination of 
the two, and may exhibit peculiarities in form and behavior 
which may not fit neatly into any blueprint or design. Thus, if 
growth can be generated by nonprivatized entities with poorly 
defined property rights, privatization for the purpose of creat-
ing clear and well-defined property rights may not be a prereq-
uisite for all transitional economies. China has challenged the 
assumption that there is but one route to economic productivi-
ty for transitional economies. If the end can be achieved by 
means other than state sector privatization, and if the great 
social costs associated therewith can be avoided, then the Chi-
nese model has in fact proved that wholesale privatization of 
state enterprises is not the economic imperative it has been 
made out to be. 
241. In this respect, the Chinese experience is in some ways not that radically 
different from the Western experience, which also exhibits a variety of ownership 
rights and arrangements. Thus, it is interesting to note that the conventional pre-
scription issued by the shock therapists-unbridled, indivisible and private owner-
ship rights-does not even reflect the reality of Western experience. 
